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Constitutional Law
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE - IN AN INDICT-
MENT DISMISSAL HEARING, A REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE TO REFUSE
VERIFICATION OF A SELF-AvoWED SOURCE IS QUALIFIED AND MUST
BE BALANCED AGAINST SOCIETAL INTERESTS AND THE
RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT.
United States v. Criden (1980)
Attorney Howard Criden and Philadelphia City Councilmen Harry
P. Jannotti, Louis C. Johanson, and George X. Schwartz were indicted
by a federal grand jury for violations of the Anti-Racketeering Act and
the Hobbs Act.' The alleged violations were exposed during a govern-
ment undercover operation known as ABSCAM. 2 The defendants
sought to have the indictments dismissed for prosecutorial misconduct,
charging that the government had deliberately released sensational and
prejudicial information to the news media in the hope of creating an
atmosphere inimical to the defendants' rights.
3
At the indictment dismissal hearing, Jan Schaffer, a reporter who
covered the ABSCAM story for the Philadelphia Inquirer,4 was sub-
poenaed as a defense witness to determine the scope and purpose of her
contacts with Peter Vaira, the United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. 5 Vaira had previously testified that although
1. United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 924 (1981). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, 1962 (1976).
2. 633 F.2d at 348. The defendants were charged with receiving illegal
payments from FBI undercover agents posing as Arab sheiks. Id.
3. Id. at 354. Specifically, the defense charged that the government had
"intentionally caused the premature and excessive media coverage of the
ABSCAM investigation, in order to stampede the grand jury into returning the
indictment, and in order to preclude responsible officials in the Justice Depart-
ment from declining to prosecute." Id. (citations omitted). FBI officials have
described ABSCAM as an operation of major proportions, beginning in 1978 or
earlier, but not focusing on public officials until the fall of 1979. Id. at 348.
On approximately December 12, 1979, Thomas P. Puccio, chief of the Justice
Department's Organized Crime Strike Force in Brooklyn, New York, who was the
head of the operation from its inception, transmitted a detailed memorandum
describing ABSCAM to top government officials in Washington. Id. at 349.
Later both Puccio and Peter Vaira, the United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, testified that the intimate details from the memorandum
had been leaked to the press by unknown government officials. Id.
4. Id. at 349-51. Schaffer wrote an expos6 of the ABSCAM operation one
or two days after the breaking of the story on national television. Id. at 349.
5. Id. at 349-51. Vaira had testified that he had learned on February 2,
1980 that the ABSCAM operation was about to be exposed in the national
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he had confirmed some of the information which Schaffer had gathered
from sources unknown to him, he was not the primary source of her
news article on ABSCAM.6 While on the witness stand, Schaffer refused
to either confirm or deny Vaira's statements. 7 Schaffer predicated her
refusal on the assertion that an answer would have revealed, either
directly or indirectly, a source of news and was therefore violative of a
journalist's qualified first amendment right to the confidentiality of her
sources.8 When Schaffer persisted in her refusal to testify,9 the district
court cited her for civil contempt of court.10
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit 11 affirmed the contempt citation, holding that although a
journalist has a qualified first amendment evidentiary privilege not to
reveal her sources, the privilege does not permit the journalist to refuse
to affirm or deny that she had a conversation with a self-avowed source
where the conversation is arguably relevant to the motivation and
credibility of that source. United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 924 (1981).
breaking and advised her to "catch up" on the story. Id. Although Vaira ad-
mitted on direct examination that he had confirmed parts of information Schaffer
had gathered from unknown sources, he denied allegations that he was the
source of the information which Schaffer used to write her expose. Id.
6. Id. at 349.
7. Id. at 350. The question which was asked and which Schaffer refused
to answer was: "On February 2, 1980, did you have a conversation with Mr.
Vaira concerning ABSCAM?" Id. Schaffer was directed by the court to answer
the question either yes or no. Id. The trial court then reiterated to Schaffer
that she was being asked nothing more than whether she had had a conversation
with Vaira. Id.
The Criden court emphasized that the explicit question before the court
was whether Schaffer was required to confirm a conversation she had with Vaira,
a self-avowed source. Id. at 358. Further, the court found the case to implicitly
present the question of whether Schaffer was required to "reveal the substance
of Vaira's conversation with her, omitting portions that explicitly identify other
sources." Id.
8. Id. at 350. Schaffer further asserted that the ABSCAM defendants had
failed to show that the information sought was crucial to their defense or that
the information sought was unavailable from other sources. Id. Schaffer also
asserted that the compelled disclosure of sources was premature. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The court gave Schaffer the ability to purge herself of the contempt
citation by answering the question. Id. The judge remanded Schaffer into the
custody of the United States Marshal until she answered the question. Id. If
Schaffer did not answer the question within six months, she would have been
freed. Id.
Subsequently, Schaffer decided to testify and she purged herself of the con-
tempt citation by answering the prosecutor's question with one word - "yes."
In re Jan Schaffer Contempt Hearing, No. 80-00166-01, document No. 117
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 1981).
11. The case was heard by Judges Aldisert and Hunter and Judge Sylvia H.
Rambo of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Penn-
sylvania, sitting by designation. Judge Aldisert wrote the majority opinion and
Judge Rambo filed a concurring opinion.
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Neither the common law of England nor the United States provides
journalists with the privilege to conceal confidential sources. 12 The
rule was that every man owed his testimony when called by the govern-
ment to give evidence.' 3 Society's need for confidential relationships
was deemed to be subordinate to the demand for truth in a court of
law.14 There was a single exception to the common law rule which
allowed an evidentiary privilege for the communications between the
attorney and his client.15 Modified forms of an evidentiary privilege
were only reluctantly granted to the priest-penitent 16 and the physician-
12. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286, at 528-30 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
For a general discussion of journalist's privilege, see D'Alemberte, Journalists
Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential Sources of Information, 6 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 307 (1969); Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes, and the Developing Qualified
Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709 (1975); Comment, The Newsman's
Privilege After Branzburg, The Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 160 (1976); Note, Reporters and Their Sources, The Constitutional Right
to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317 (1970).
13. J. WIGMoRE, supra note 12, § 2286, at 528-30. Nelson, The Newsmen's
Privilege Against Disclosure of Confidential Sources of Information, 6 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 307 (1969). For a general overview of the historical developments in
journalist privilege, see Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain from
Divulging the Sources of His Information, 36 VA. L. REv. 61 (1950).
For a recent and comprehensive work on journalist privilege, see J. BARRON
& C. DIENEs, HANDBOOK OF FRE SPEECH AND FREE PRss (1979). For a discussion
of the development of special press rights, see Benason, The New Free Press
Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731 (1972); Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77 (1975).
14. J. W vmioRE, supra note 12, § 2285, at 528, citing Cox v. Montague, 78
F. 845 (6th Cir. 1897); Roof v. State, 34 Okla. Crim. 145, 245 P. 666 (1926).
15. J. Wimo, supra note 12, § 2290, at 543. Wigmore states that the
attorney-client privilege first arose in the very early common law as protection
for the oath and honor of the attorney rather than for the protection of the
client. Id.
Wigmore has determined that four fundamental conditions are recognized
as prerequisites for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of a
communication:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the com-
munity ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relationship by the dis-
closure of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
Id. § 2285, at 527 (emphasis added).
Although it would seem fundamental to our legal system that full disclosure
between attorney and client is necessary to properly advise the client, Wigmore
is uncertain of both the soundness and necessity of the privilege. See id. § 2290,
at 554.
16. Id. § 2394, at 869-78. Wigmore found that although the privilege for
priest-penitent was not officially recognized in English courts, disclosure was
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patient relationships. 17  Journalists, like accountants' s and social
workers I were denied an evidentiary privilege because the courts felt
that any further extension of the privilege was at variance with the
demands of justice.20 Although journalists have been moderately suc-
cessful in persuading state legislatures to enact "shield laws," these
statutory forms of testimonial privilege have been passed in only twenty-
six states, and offer varying degrees of protection, and, despite their
repeated efforts, journalists have never prompted the enactment of a
federal shield law.
21
After failing in their efforts to establish a common law privilege,
or analogize their profession to the professions traditionally granted
870. In the United States, modern rulings are rare. Id. § 2394, at 873. A case
upholding the privilege acknowledged that the common law did not explicitly
recognize it. See United States v. Mullen, 263 F.2d 275, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
17. J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2380, at 818. The privilege arose out of
the medical profession's desire to have the same rights of confidentiality as the
legal profession. Id. § 2380a, at 830. However, the argument for the establish-
ment of a physician-patient privilege arose from a different and less compelling
basis, namely, the view of medical practitioners that the privilege was necessary
for the honor of their profession. Id. § 2380a, at 831 (emphasis in original).
The physcian-patient privilege would probably never have arisen at all in the
United States except for the codification of the privilege by the New York
legislature. Id. § 2380, at 819. It is now accepted by about two-thirds of the
states. Id. § 2380, at 820.
18. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 325 (1973) (no confidential ac-
countant-client privilege exists under federal law, and no state created privilege
has been recognized in federal cases). Contra, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 9.11(a)
(Purdon Supp. 1980-81) (privileged communication for Certified Public Ac-
countants).
19. Fitzgerald v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 451 F.2d 670, 682 (2d Cir. 1971) (no
privilege for communications arising in interview with psychiatric social worker).
20. J. WiGMoR, supra note 12 § 2286, at 528. See J. BARRON & C. DIENES,
supra note 13, at 419-21.
21. For a comparison of the statutes which have been enacted, see ALA.
CODE tit. 12, § 12-21-142 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150 (1973); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1980-81); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977 Replace-
ment); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 4320-26 (Michie 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-119 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1980-81); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§421.100 (Baldwin 1969); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§45:1451-1454 (West Supp.
1981); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1974); Mien. STAT. ANN.
§28.945(1) (Callaghan 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§595-021-025 (West Supp.
1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to 03 (1979 Replacement); NEB. REv.
STAT. §§ 20-144 to 20-147 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. tit. § 49-275 (1975); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to 21a (West Supp. 1980-81); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (Supp.
1978); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 79-h (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Page 1954), § 2739.04 (Page
Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 385.1-385.3 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 44.510-.540 (1979); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon 1980); R.I. GEN.
LAws §§ 9-19.1-1 to 1.3 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-1-208 (1980).
However, no consistent interpretation of these shield laws has emerged and
state courts have generally given a narrow interpretation with respect to the
type of material protected. J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 13, at 421.
[VOL. 26: p. 559
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testimonial privileges, 22 journalists argued that the first amendment
affords them a constitutionally based privilege to withhold news
sources.23 The first such argument was not made until 1958,24 and
received a poor reception in both state 25 and federal courts.26 The
For one Senator's account of the legislative deliberations on several recent
attempts to enact a federal shield law, see Ervin, In Pursuit of A Press Privilege,
11 HARV. J. LEGis. 233 (1974).
22. See generally Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for News-
men Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 18 (1969); Comment, The
Newsmens Privilege Two Years After Branzburg v. Hayes: The First Amend-
ment in Jeopardy, 49 TULANE L. REV. 417 (1975).
23. J. BARRON &: C. DIENES, supra note 13, at 422. The arguments for a first
amendment-based privilege are rooted in the doctrine that the framers of the
Constitution intended to give the first amendment the "broadest possible scope."
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941). Two principal lines of reasoning
have evolved to support the privilege. First, there is a constitutionally pro-
tected right to gather news and since privileged communication fosters that
news-gathering process, it is constitutionally protected. Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
As Justice Stewart stated: "A corollary of the rights to publish must be
the right to gather news. The full flow of information to the public guar-
anteed by the free-press guarantee would be severly curtailed if no protection
whatever were afforded to the process by which news is assembled and dissemi-
nated." Id. at 727 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Second, a privileged press is a
constitutionally mandated "fourth" institution of government, provided for by
the founding fathers as a checking device on potential abuses by other branches
of government. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977
AM. B. FOUND RESEARCH J. 521, 527. Mr. Blasi notes that although the modern
theory behind the first amendment concerns the protection of dissident groups
and individuals in our society, the framers of the Constitution were more
concerned with using the press to counter the inherent tendency of government
officials to abuse the power entrusted to them. Id. at 538.
24. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958) (compelled disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources may constitute
an abridgement of first amendment rights but such first amendment rights must
yield to the public policy that all witnesses must testify).
25. See, e.g., In re Goodfadler, 45 Haw. 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961) (other
interests outweigh any constitutional rights); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193
A.2d 181 (1963) (although state shield law protected journalist's privilege, court
rejected first amendment argument).
The prevailing reason for the rejection of a privilege for journalists was
that it would seemingly place the press above the law. J. BARRON & C. DIENES,
supra note 13, at 525. See also State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 248, 436 P.2d
729, 731, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968). The Buchanan court stated:
[I]t would be difficult to rationalize a rule that would create special
constitutional rights for those possessing credentials as news gatherers
which would not conflict with the equal privileges and equal protec-
tion concepts also found in the Constitution .... We hold that there
is no Constitutional reason for creating a qualified right for some,
but not others, to withhold evidence as an aid to newsgathering.
250 Or. at 248-51, 436 P.2d at 731-32.
26. See, e.g., Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969),
cert. dismissed per stipulation, 402 U.S. 901 (1971) (in the absence of a statu-
torily based testimonial privilege, a journalist must reveal his sources before a
court of law); Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D.
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United States Supreme Court first considered the issue in the landmark
case of Branzburg v. Hayes.27
Branzburg, a reporter, was subpoenaed by a grand jury to answer
questions which involved information that he had received from con-
fidential sources while researching a news story.28 Claiming a first
amendment privilege, Branzburg refused to obey the trial court's order
to disclose his sources.29 On appeal, the Supreme Court, in a five to
four decision, held that the criminal investigatory purpose of a grand
jury was fundamental to effective law enforcement 30 and that the need
for a grand jury to have the power to compel testimony was paramount
to any first amendment rights of the reporter.3' The Branzburg Court
27. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The cases decided with Branzburg were United
States v. Caldwell, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) and In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 797
(1971), aff'd sub nor. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). All three cases
involved a reporter attempting to quash a subpoena ordering his appearance
and/or testimony before a grand jury. Id. The motion to quash was denied in
Branzburg. Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971), aff'd
sub noma. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). However, in Caldwell, the
Ninth Circuit granted the motion, holding that a journalist need not appear
before a grand jury absent a showing of compelling need for his presence.
United States v. Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1089.
For the reactions of various commentators to the Branzburg decision, see
Goodale, supra note 12; Murvasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and
Its Aftermath, 52 TEx. L. REV. 829 (1974); Comment, supra note 12.
28. 408 U.S. at 668. Branzburg was a reporter for the Louisville Courier-
Journal who had written two articles on drug use, one concerning the manu-
facture of hashish from marijuana in Jefferson County, and another about the
"drug scene" in Franklin County, Kentucky. Id. In preparing both articles,
Branzburg had witnessed the criminal production and use of illegal drugs,
conduct which was the focus of the grand jury investigation. Id.
29. Id. at 667-69.
30. Id. at 686-90. The Court noted that the heart of Branzburg's argu-
ment was that "the burden on newsgathering resulting from compelling re-
porters to disclose confidential information outweighs any public interest in
attaining that information." Id. at 681.
In response to Branzburg's claim, the Court noted that fair and effective
law enforcement aimed at providing security for the person and property of
the individual is a fundamental function of government, and a grand jury
plays an important, constitutionally-mandated role in this process. 408 U.S. at
686-90.
31. 408 U.S. at 690. Although the Court recognized a first amendment
interest in newsgathering, it did not afford much protection to that right.
J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 13, at 824-28. The Court's approach seemed
to limit the first amendment interest to the personal privilege of the journalist
as a citizen and overlooked the general societal interest in newsgathering. See
id. The Court indicated its reluctance to create a special right for journalists,
noting: "We are asked to create another privilege by interpreting the First
Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do
not enjoy. This we decline to do." 408 U.S. at 690.
However, the majority did give some support to the idea that newsgather.
ing is protected under the first amendment when it stated: "Nor is it suggested
that newsgathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be evis-
cerated." Id. However, the Court rejected the contention that the first
[VOL. 26: p. 559
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further stated that granting a qualified privilege to newsmen would be
both impractical, 2 unhelpfula3 and unduly burdensome to the task of
a grand jury.
4
amendment guarantees the press "a constitutional right of special access to
information not available to the public generally." Id. at 684, citing New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-30 (1971) (Stewart, J. concur-
ring); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965). See O'Brien, Reassessing the
First Amendment and the Public's Right to Know in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 26 VILL. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (1980).
32. 408 U.S. at 704-06. The Court concluded that the determination of
who qualified as a member of the press and, consequently, who would be
protected under a qualified privilege, would be extremely difficult to make. Id.
Recognizing that the liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer
as much as it the right of the major newspaper, the Court noted that almost
any person or group could claim a press privilege. Id. at 705. Thus, the
courts would be embroiled in a preliminary determination needed to identify
legitimate journalists, who qualified for the privilege, from "sham" journalists
who claimed the privilege in order to avoid testifying. Id. This dilemma
would place the courts in a situation which is perilously close to the licensing
of journalists. J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 13, at 431. See also, First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 735 (1980); Lowell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)
(the press in its historic connotation includes every vehicle of information
dissemination).
33. 408 U.S. at 702. The court maintained that only the granting of an
absolute privilege would resolve journalists' fears stemming from the possibility
of compelled source disclosure. Id. Justice White stated: "If newsmen's con-
fidential sources are as sensative as they are claimed to be, the prospect of
being unmasked whenever a judge determines the situation justifies it, is
hardly a satisfactory solution to the problem." Id.
34. Id. at 701-02. The most important consideration persuading the Court
not to require a preliminary showing of need before compelling disclosure, was
the Court's view that the grand jury must be free to make its own determina-
tion of its need for evidence. Id. The Court reasoned that to play its role
as an instrument of law enforcement, the grand jury must have ready access
to every man's evidence. Id. In the Court's view, the grand jury must be
able to proceed on the basis of tips, rumors or clues, and its examination of
witnesses must not be obstructed by a requirement that it prove a compelling
need for testimony whenever a newsman claims that his access to confidential
sources would be jeopardized should he be compelled to testify. Id.
This view of the needs of the grand jury was essential to reconciling
Branzburg with the established principle that government action must not
infringe upon first amendment liberties any more than is necessary to accom-
plish a legitimate government purpose. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russel, 384 U.S.
11, 18 (1966); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56, (1965). See generally
Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
The Branzburg Court did hold that a journalist before a grand jury had
some measure of protection. See 408 U.S. at 707. The Court stated:
. . . [N]ews gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,
and grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in
good faith, would pose wholly different issues for resolution under
the First Amendment. Official harassment of the press undertaken
not for the purpose of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter's
relationship with his news sources would have no justification. Grand
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Mr. Justice Powell, in his pivotal concurring opinion,35 mitigated
the effect of the majority's holding by acknowledging the existence of a
first amendment privilege but prescribing a case-by-case approach bal-
ancing the rights of the journalist and societal interests. 3 6 Mr. Justice
Stewart, in his dissent,3 7 argued that journalists did possess a qualified
first amendment privilege 38 and articulated a three-pronged test which
the government must satisfy before that privilege would be set aside in
a particular case.
8 9
As the lone Supreme Court decision directly addressing the issue
of journalist privilege, Branzburg has been subject to widely varying
interpretations by the lower courts40 in both criminal41 and civil
35. 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring). justice Powell's concurring
opinion in Branzburg was labeled "enigmatic" by the dissent. Id. at 725
(Stewart, J., dissenting). In a lecture at Yale Law School, Justice Stewart de-
scribed the Branzburg decision as being "four and a half to four and a half,
when reffering to Justice Powell's concurring opinion. Stewart, Or of the
Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 635 (1975).
36. 408 U.S. at 710. (Powell, J., concurring). Although Justice Powell was
in favor of a case-by-case approach, he made clear that he did not accept the
dissent's test which, in his view, would defeat and unduly subordinate "the
essential societal interest in the detection and prosecution of crime." Id. at
710 n.0 (Powell, J., concurring).
justice Powell's test did not seem to place the burden of proof on either
party; instead, the court would be free to balance the competing interests in a
particular case. See id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Stewart was joined in
his dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote
a separate dissenting opinion in which he stated that the first amendment gave
an absolute privilege to reporters. 408 U.S. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissent found a qualified
privilege followed as a matter of logic, once three predicates were recognized:
1) newsmen require informants to gather news; 2) confidentiality - the promise
or understanding that names or certain aspects of communications will be
kept off record - is essential to the creation and maintenance of a news-
gathering relationship with informants; and 3) the possession by the grand jury
of an unbridled subpoena power - unchecked by a constitutional right pro-
tecting confidential relationships from compulsory process - will either deter
sources from divulging information or deter reporters from gathering and pub-
lishing information. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that in order
to compel disclosure the government must: 1) show that there is probable
cause to believe that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a
specific probable violation of the law, 2) demonstrate that the information
sought cannot be obtained by alternate means less destructive of first amend-
ment rights; and 3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the
information. Id.
40. See J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 13, at 824-74; Goodale, supra
note 12.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff'd, 559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1977) (Branzburg holds that a journalist's first
amendment rights must be balanced against the defendant's sixth amendment
rights in a criminal trial); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974)
(Branzburg confined to grand jury proceeding, in other contexts first amend-
ment rights should be balanced against the interests of the state).
Although Branzburg dealt solely with the question of journalist privilege
in a grand jury context, Justice White, in dicta, indicated that the Court's
[VOL. 26: p. 559
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cases. 42 However, Branzburg has been almost uniformly followed by
the lower courts in disallowing any claim to a journalist privilege in a
grand jury proceeding.
4 3
It is in the area of civil litigation that journalists' claims for a consti-
tutional privilege have met with the most success.4 4 The particular
concerns involved in a criminal context - the need for law enforcement,
possible social stigma or imprisonment, as well as the concern for a
defendant's sixth amendment rights - are not factors in a civil case.45
Thus, courts have been more willing to find first amendment rights
paramount in civil cases.
4 6
holding was equally applicable to a criminal trial. See 408 U.S. at 670-91.
The Court stated:
[W]e perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law en-
forcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insuffi-
cient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news-
gathering that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other
citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the courts at a
valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial.
Id. (emphasis added).
42. See, e.g., Baker v. F.&F. Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 966 (1973) (Branzburg is strictly limited to grand jury proceedings and
not dispositive in a civil proceeding); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356
F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973) (adoption of Justice Powell's balancing test in a
civil action).
43. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975); In re
Lewis, 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 913 (1975); In re
McGowan, 298 A.2d 339 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 303
A.2d 645 (Del. 1973); Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (Ct.
Spec. App.), afl'd, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951
(1973); In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (App. Div. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973); In re WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 A.D.2d 5, 344
N.Y.S.2d 393 (1973); People by Fisher v. Dan, 41 A.D.2d 687, 342 N.Y.S.2d 731,
appeal dismissed, 32 N.Y.2d 764, 298 N.E.2d 118, 344 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1973);
Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
But see Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, rehearing denied, 466 F.2d
1059 (9th Cir. 1972) (journalist appearing before a Grand Jury granted a
qualified testimonial privilege).
44. Barron, The Rise and Fall of a Doctrine of Editorial Privilege: Reflec-
tions on Herbert v. Lando, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1002, 1007 (1979).
45. See J. BARRON 8 C. DIENES, supra note 13, at 452-54. An additional
consideration was voiced in Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974). The Carey court noted that:
Justice White [in Branzburg] also relied on the various procedures
available to prosecutors and grand juries to protect informants, and
on the careful use by the government of the power to compel testi-
mony. . . . Private litigants are not similarly charged with the public
interest and may be more prone to seek wholesale and indiscriminate
disclosure.
492 F.2d at 636 n.6.
46. A journalist's privilege to refuse to disclose his sources in civil cases
arises in three principle contexts. J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 13, at
452-53. First, a journalist who is not a party to a civil proceeding may be com-
pelled by court order to give evidence. Id. Second, a journalist, as a party
defendant in a civil proceeding, such as an action for defamation, may resist
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The Third Circuit's decision in Riley v. City of Chester 47 illustrates
the approach of many courts to the question of whether a journalist
possesses an evidentiary privilege in civil litigation. The Riley court
held that a journalist has a qualified evidentiary privilege, and that
disclosure of a reporter's sources should be compelled only if the moving
party satisfies three requirements. 48 Under Riley, the party seeking
disclosure of a reporter's confidential source must: 1) have made an
effort to obtain the information from other sources; 49 2) have demon-
strated that the information is only available through the journalist; 5o
and 3) have proven that the information is relevant to his claim.5 ' The
court then determined that the trial court must balance on a case-by-case
basis the policies underlying the privilege 52 against the need for the
evidence sought to be obtained.
53
through discovery or in testimony at trial. Id. Finally, the journalist, as
plaintiff in a civil proceeding, may resist efforts by the defendant to compel
disclosure. Id.
47. 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979). The plaintiff, Riley, was a former Chester
policeman who was suing the Mayor and the Chief of Police of Chester for
violations of his constitutional rights with respect to his freedom to conduct a
campaign for Mayor. Id. at 710. During the trial, Riley called as a witness a
reporter who had covered the mayoral campaign and questioned her about the
source of her information. Id. at 711. The Third Circuit upheld the reporter's
refusal to disclose her source and articulated a three-pronged test which the
moving party must satisfy before the court would compel the journalist to
disclose a source. Id. at 717. For a discussion of this test, see notes 49-53 and
accompanying text infra.
48. 612 F.2d at 716. These requirements are in essence the three-pronged
test articulated by Justice Stewart in his dissent in Branzburg. See note 39
supra.
49. 612 F.2d at 717, citing Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505,
510 (E.D. Va. 1976).
50. 612 F.2d at 717, citing Zerilli v. Bell, 458 F. Supp. 26, 29 (D.D.C.
1978).
51. 612 F.2d at 717, citing Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v. Charles Levy Cir-
culating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197, 1204 (N.D. I1. 1978).
52. 612 F.2d at 715-16. The Riley court placed great emphasis on the need
to protect the vital role played by the press in a free society. Id. at 715.
Addressing the need to encourage and protect the newsgathering process, the
court stated:
We would be unrealistic if we did not take judicial notice of another
matter of wide public knowledge and great importance, namely that
important information, tips and leads, will dry up and the public will
often be deprived of the knowledge of dereliction of public duty,
bribery, corruption, conspiracy and other crimes committed by public
officials or by powerful individuals or organizations, unless newsmen
are able to fully and completely protect the sources of their informa-
tion. It is vitally important that this public shield against govern-
mental inefficiency, corruption and crime be preserved against piercing
and erosion.
Id., quoting In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 40, 193 A.2d 181, 185 (1963) (emphasis in
original).
53. 612 F.2d at 716-18. The court distinguished Riley from other cases
where a reporter has been compelled to testify by noting that Riley presented
"simply a situation where a journalist has been called as a witness in a civil suit
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Although it is arguable that the journalist's privilege articulated in
Riley was valid only in the context of a civil action,54 the Third Circuit
in United States v. Cuthbertson 55 held that the same balancing test
would be applied to all cases, criminal or civil,5 6 in which the question
in which neither she nor her employer has any personal interest." Id. at 716.
The court then found that "under the circumstances, plaintiff must demonstrate
why his interest in civil litigation ... is dependent upon the information
sought." Id.
In fitting the specific facts of Riley into its test for compelling disclosure,
the court determined that a number of factors precluded a conclusion that the
journalist's testimony was necessary. Id. at 717. The court emphasized three
factors in making this determination. Id. First, the journalist was the first
witness to testify other than the plaintiff and there were other available witnesses
who were much more likely to have either been the source of the reporter's in-
formation, or to have knowledge of the source. Id. Second, the defendant,
Battle, was the admitted source of much of the information in the news story
and was the likely source of the journalist's story, but wasn't questioned. Id.
Third, and most importantly, the court determined that the information sought
was of little relevance to the plaintiff's case since the news story referred to in-
vestigations completed long before the election began and the plaintiff's theory
in the case involved the defendant's attempts to sabotage the election. id. at
717-18. The court refused to compel the reporter to reveal her source. Id.
at 718.
54. 612 F.2d at 716. The Riley court stated that: "Such a case-by-case
analysis [of the reporter's privilege] is mandated even more in civil cases than in
criminal cases, for in the former the public's interest in casting a protective
shroud over the newsmen's sources and information warrants an even greater
weight than in the latter." Id., quoting Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building &
Constr. Trades Council, 443 F. Supp. 489, 491 (E.D. Pa. 1977). For a discussion
of the different considerations involved in determining a reporter's privilege in
a civil action, see notes 44-46 and accompanying text supra.
55. 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980). Cuthbertson involved a grand jury probe
into the franchising activity of Wild Bill's Family Restaurants whose alleged
illegalities were uncovered during investigations by the Columbia Broadcasting
System's (CBS) news program 60 MINUTES. Id. at 142. The defendants
sought discovery of 60 MINUTES notes, memoranda, reports, and documents of
any kind relevant to their defense. Id. at 142-43. The trial court held that the
Third Circuit's ruling in Riley was controlling and that CBS had a qualified
privilege to the confidentiality of its sources, even though the prosecution had
obtained waivers of the privilege from the witnesses in question. Id. at 143.
The court was of the opinion that this privilege would only yield if the de-
fendants could prove a need for the information sought, under the test articu-
lated in Riley. Id. The court concluded that it could not make this determi.
nation without seeing the information which was in CBS' possession. Id.
Therefore, the court ordered CBS to furnish the information to the court for an
in camera review. Id. CBS refused to comply with the court's order, claiming a
qualified privilege and was cited for civil contempt of court. Id. at 143-44.
CBS appealed the contempt citation. Id.
56. Id. at 146-47. The court stated:
Although Riley did not consider the existence of a qualified privilege
in a criminal case, we find it to be persuasive authority in this case.
First the interests of the press that form the foundation for the
privilege are not diminished because the nature of the underlying pro-
ceeding out of which the request for the information arises is a criminal
trial. CBS' interest in protecting confidential sources, preventing intru-
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of journalist privilege arose.57
Despite the trend in most courts toward the recognition of a
qualified journalist privilege, 58 some doubt exists as to the eventual
position of the Supreme Court, particularly in light of the Court's recent
decision in Herbert v. Lando.5 9 In this libel action against a journalist,
the Court held that there is no absolute editorial privilege to withhold
prepublication notes and memoranda of the journalist from discovery. 60
censorship created by compelled disclosure of sources and unpublished
notes does not change because a case is civil or criminal.
Id.
The court further stated that the constitutional rights of the defendants to
a fair trial do not always prevail over the first amendment rights underlying the
reporter's privilege. Id. at 147. Finding that a defendant's sixth amendment
and due process rights "are not irrelevant," the court nonetheless determined
that these rights are only important factors to be considered in the balancing
process when determining the existence in any particular case of a reporter's
privilege. Id.
The court also held that the privilege extends beyond the protection of con-
fidential sources and precluded the compelled production of any reporter's re-
source materials. Id. Reasoning that the foundation for a reporter's privilege
is the public policy favoring the free flow of information to the public, the court
concluded that any significant intrusion into the newsgathering and editorial
process was prohibited by the privilege. Id.
57. id. at 146-47. As the only issue before the court in Cuthbertson was
whether the defendant must make a preliminary showing of need before the
trial court can order an in camera review, the Third Circuit did not give a
detailed analysis of the test for disclosure within the factual situation before the
trial court in Cuthbertson. However, the Third Circuit did hold that the de-
fendant must make a preliminary showing that the information sought was
relevant evidentiary material and was not available from another source. Id. at
148-49. The court determined that the defendants had satisfied the prelimianry
requirements and affirmed the contempt citation. Id. at 149.
The court summarily dismissed the argument that the testimonial privilege
and corresponding right to confidentiality of sources was waived when the 60
MINUTES informants agreed to testify for the government and consequently
revealed themselves to the defendants. Id. at 147. Analogizing the newsmen's
privilege to the attorney-client privilege, the court held that the journalist
privilege belonged to the journalist and could only be waived by its holder 1d.
The Third Circuit has subsequently reaffirmed its position in Cuthbertson and,
incidentally its result in Criden, in a subsequent opinion in the Cuthbertson
case. See United States v. Cuthbertson, Nos. 81-1467, 81-1470 & 81-1485, slip
op. at 13-4 (3d Cir. May 29, 1981).
58. Barron, supra note 44, at 1007.
59. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). See generally Barron, supra note 44; Bezanson,
Herbert v. Lando, Edztorial Judgement, and Freedom of the Press: An Essay,
1978 U. ILL. L.F. 605 (1978).
60. 441 U.S. at 173-75. In Herbert, the Court determined that no editorial
privilege should be created that would prevent discovery of matters that might
show actual malice on the part of a media libel defendant in an action brought
by a public figure plaintiff. Id. at 169-73. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964). The New York Times Court held that a public figure
plaintiff in a libel action is required to prove "actual malice" on the part of the
press in order to recover. Id. at 279-83. The doctrine of actual malice requires
proof that the journalist published a false statement about the plaintiff in reck-
less disregard of the truth. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580-A, com-
ment d (1977). The decision by the Court in Lando was an accommodation to
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However, while the Lando Court made no mention of a balancing test,
the Court implicitly acknowledged a weighing of competing interests,
noting that "evidentiary privileges are not favored, and even those
rooted in the constitution must give way in the proper circumstances." 61
It was against this background that the Third Circuit in Criden
addressed the issue of whether the first amendment permits a journalist,
called as a defense witness in a criminal proceeding, to refuse to affirm
or deny that she had a conversation with a self-avowed source where the
conversation is arguably relevant to the credibility and motivation of
that source.6 2 Judge Aldisert, writing for the majority, found that the
New York Times v. Sullivan because the Court was of the opinion that there is
no way to prove actual malice without having access to prepublication thoughts
and notes of the reporter. See Barron, supra note 44, at 1013.
The question of whether a newspaper or reporter has an editorial privilege
- the right to withhold prepublication or unpublished documents, notes, and
films - usually arises in a civil context, but can arise in a criminal trial or in a
grand jury proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139
(3d Cir. 1980) (distinction between editorial and testimonial privilege is blurred
in the case where names of confidential informants were located on documents
and films in possession of the editorial staff of a newsprogram). One court has
found that the right to an editorial privilege follows from a journalist's testi-
monial privilege. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S.
153 (1979). Unlike the journalist's testimonial privilege, which emanates from
the press' claim to a constitutional right to gather news, the argument for an
editorial privilege arises from the press' claim of an uninhibited constitutional
right to publish. See Barron, supra note 44, at 1009. However, both privileges
involve similar considerations of a first amendment clash with other societal
interests.
61. 441 U.S. at 175. The Court has been recently subject to petition by the
organized, institutional press to grant it special status deriving from a modern
interpretation of the first amendment. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539 (1976) (challenge to "gag order" by institutional media); Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (challenge by newspapers
to state "right to reply" statute); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971) (publication of the Pentagon Papers by the organized press); Penne-
kamp v. Florida, 388 U.S. 331 (1946) (Cartoons and editorials criticizing a
Florida trial court did not present a clear and present danger to the integrity
of the court).
For a discussion of problems associated with the evolution of the corporate
press, see notes 101-09 and accompanying text infra.
62. 633 F.2d at 348. The court first disposed of arguments presented by
both the defense and the government which would have mooted the question of
journalists' privilege and found that the constitutional issue must be confronted.
Id. at 350-54. The appellant had argued that the contempt proceeding was
moot because the pretrial record was closed. Id. at 351. As the record was
closed, Schaffer argued that her testimony was no longer needed, and conse-
quently, the reason for the contempt citation had dissipated. Id. However,
the Third Circuit noted that the trial court had retained an option to open the
pretrial record and rejected this argument. Id. The court further noted that,
contrary to the appellant's claim, a civil contempt order does implicate the
court's integrity, and therefore a ruling on the contempt order was necessary in
order to uphold the authority of the court. Id. at 351-53.
The court, citing the deeply rooted doctrine that federal courts ought not
to decide questions of constitutionality unless adjudication is unavoidable, next
confronted the government's argument that the appeal of the contempt order
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case highlighted a tension between first, fifth and sixth amendment
rights. 63 The court noted the numerous Supreme Court decisions ex-
pressing the importance of the first amendment 64 and, relying upon
Riley,6 5 determined that "journalists have a federal common law priv-
ilege, albeit qualified, to refuse to disclose their confidential sources." 16
The court found that the only issue before it was whether the
district court's contempt order comported with the Third Circuit's de-
cision in Riley.67 Applying the Riley three-pronged test,68 the court
produced the kind of evidence necessary to justify a dismissal of the indictment.
Id. at 352. While noting that such an argument was facially appealing, the
court nonetheless felt that the defendants must be allowed an opportunity to
prove their allegations of outrageous prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 354-55.
63. 633 F.2d at 355, citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J.,
concurring). The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . .. ..
U.S. CONST. amend. I. Judge Aldisert noted that the sixth amendment requires
that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses, and the fifth amendment guarantees that he shall not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 633 F.2d at 355.
The opinion then noted that the precise text of the Constitution was inade-
quate for a decision and that the court must look to the gloss added to the
Constitution by various Supreme Court decisions. Id.
64. 633 F.2d at 355, citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100
S. Ct. 2814, 2825 (1980) (reporters are viewed as surrogates for the public); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (first amendment is bot-
tomed on a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (first amendment was fashioned to assure un-
fettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people).
65. For a discussion of Riley, see notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.
66. 633 F.2d at 355. The court also found that common sense reasons for
keeping sources confidential also underlie the necessity of a journalist privilege.
Id. at 355-56. Noting that in certain sectors of society information flows more
freely when from anonymous sources, the court stated that "the rule protecting
a journalist's source does not depart significantly from daily experience in in-
formal dissemination of information." Id. at 356.
67. Id. at 358. For a discussion of Riley, see notes 47-53 and accompanying
text supra. The court made clear that the Riley test is utilized to determine
under what circumstances a journalist will lose his qualified privilege to refuse
to name a source. 633 F.2d at 658. However, the court explicitly pointed out
that the case at hand did not involve a question of source disclosure, as Schaffer
was only required to confirm or deny that she had a conversation with Vaira.
Id. The court acknowledged the case presented the implicit question of whether
Schaffer would be required to reveal the substance of her conversation with
Vaira, omitting portions that explicitly identify other sources. Id.
68. 633 F.2d at 358. The court noted that before it should apply the
balancing test, the moving party must first show that he had attempted to ob-
tain the information from other sources. Id. Unlike Riley, Criden did not
involve the compelled disclosure of a reporter's source but merely the con-
firmation by a reporter of a voluntarily disclosed self-confessed source. Id. For
the exact question which Schaffer refused to answer, see note 7 supra.
Observing that the question of whether to compel a reporter to reveal her
source involved a more stringent application of the Riley test than was needed
under the circumstances in Criden, where the reporter was asked merely to
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concluded that the defendants had demonstrated that: 1) they had
attempted to obtain the information from other sources; 69 2) there was
no other source from which to obtain the information; 70 and 3) the
information was relevant and important to their defense. 71 Conse-
quently, the court affirmed the district court's contempt citation.72
The majority noted that its holding was limited to the question of
whether Schaffer would be compelled to confirm Peter Vaira's testimony
that he had a conversation with her concerning ABSCAM. 73 The court
explicitly pointed out that it made no ruling on whether Schaffer would
ultimately be compelled to reveal her source or sources should the
defense seek such a disclosure.
7 4
Although recognizing that, under Cuthbertson,75 Vaira's admission
did not constitute a waiver of Schaffer's own qualified privilege not to
confirm prior testimony, the court held that the movant in Criden had a lesser
burden of proof than the movant in Riley. 633 F.2d at 358.
The court summarized the Riley test by stating: "In striking the delicate
balance between the assertion of the privilege on the one hand and the interest
of either criminal or civil litigants seeking the information, the materiality,
relevance and necessity of the information must be shown." Id., quoting Riley
v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d at 716.
69. 633 F.2d at 358-59. The court noted that prior to calling Schaffer as a
witness, the defendants had called Vaira as a witness and also sought release of
"The Blumenthal Report," a Department of Justice investigation into the source
of the ABSCAM leaks. Id. at 359. More importantly, after having noted the
unresolved questions in Vaira's testimony, the court concluded that the defend-
ants' next logical step was to call Schaffer. Id.
70. Id. The court found that the sole purpose of Schaffer's testimony was
to "shed light on Vaira's motivations in disclosing certain information to her,"
and on his credibility. Id. The only person able to testify on these points was
Schaffer. Id. Consequently, the court concluded that "defendants quite clearly
have no other source from which they can acquire this insight." Id.
71. Id. Observing that the defendants were attempting to prove outrageous
prosecutorial conduct sufficient to warrant dismissal, the court found answers to
the questions of Vaira's motivation and credibility were crucial to the defense's
case. Id. The court recognized that the defendants might fail to prove prose-
cutorial misconduct but held that Schaffer's testimony was important to their
attempt.
72. Id. at 360.
73. Id. at 359. Schaffer argued that if she testified that Vaira did not speak
to her, and thus was not the source of her information, the subsequent line of
questions would seek the disclosure of her actual sources. Id. The court dis-
missed this argument by noting that the district court had declared that there
would be no additional sources revealed and that it would rule on a question-by-
question basis on the permissibility of the defendants' questions. Id.
74. Id. at 360. The court stated: "Schaffer is to disclose not the source of
any information but the contents of a conversation from a named declarant
who has already testified under oath what he said to her." Id.
The Criden court had previously ruled that the compelled disclosure of a
confidential source would require a stricter application of the Riley test than
was needed on the facts before it in Criden. Id. at 358. Thus, in the court's
view, future disputes including possible source disclosure, would be resolved
under the Riley test. Id. at 359.
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reveal her nonpublished recollections of their conversation,7 0 the court
found that Schaffer's privilege must yield in this case to the defendant's
demonstrated need for the material.
77
Judge Rambo, in her concurring opinion, noted that the most
cogent argument for the recognition of a journalist privilege is that
it encourages the free flow of information by guaranteeing confiden-
tiality.78 Therefore, Judge Rambo reasoned that the rationale under-
lying the privilege disappears when, as in Criden, the confidant willingly
identifies himself and thereby destroys all expectation of confidentiality.7 9
Consequently, Judge Rambo found the majority's opinion to be an
unjustified extension of the qualified privilege recognized in Riley.80
It is submitted that both the societal interests and the factual situa-
tion before the Third Circuit in Criden were analogous to those before
the Supreme Court in Branzburg.S1 Each case involved a reporter's
claim to a first amendment right to withhold the source of his informa-
tion while testifying in a criminal proceeding.8 2 However, the Criden
court found the precedent set in Riley, a Third Circuit civil case, to be
dispositive.8 3 While the full implications of Branzburg are yet to be
developed,84 it is submitted that Branzburg provides a sounder basis for
a decision on journalist privilege within the context of a criminal trial
76. 633 F.2d at 359-60. The court found that, as in Cuthbertson, the testi-
monial privilege belonged to the journalist - Schaffer - and not to the source -
Vaira. Id. at 359. However, the court noted that Vaira's admission that he was
the source of Schaffer's information was relevant to the balancing of interests
test. Id. at 360.
77. Id. at 360.
78. 633 F.2d at 360-61 (Ram6o, J., concurring). By holding that journalists
have a testimonial privilege for the confidentiality of their sources, in spite of
the "confidential source" being self-revealed, Judge Rambo noted that the Third
Circuit in Criden was merely following its decision in Cuthbertson. Id. How-
ever, Judge Rambo objected to Cuthbertson on the same grounds that she ob-
jected to Criden. Id. In discussing her reasons the judge stated:
Rather than split hairs over when the question put to a newsman
seeks the identity of a confidential source or looks only to the source's
motivation, I would look to the present state of the expectation of
confidentiality. If that expectation no longer exists, I would hold that
the privilege no longer exists.
Id. at 361 (Rambo, J., concurring). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's de-
cision in Cuthbertson, see notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra.
79. 633 F.2d at 361. (Rambo, J., concurring).
80. Id.
81. For a discussion of the factual situation in Criden, see notes 4-11 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the factual situation in Branz-
burg, see notes 27-31 and accompanying text supra.
82. Id.
83. See 633 F.2d at 358; notes 67-72 and accompanying text supra.
84. J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 13, at 438. For a discussion of the
various interpretations given to Branzburg, see notes 40-43 and accompanying
text supra.
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than does Riley.8 5 Yet, the Criden majority, by applying the Riley test,
which is essentially the same test proposed by Justice Stewart in his
dissenting opinion in Branzburg, 6 totally ignored the rule of law
decided in Branzburg.8 7
With regard to the use of the balancing test in the application of
the journalist privilege to the present case, it is further submitted that
the Criden court did not fully consider the policy underlying the
creation of the privilege 88 and, as a consequence, was insensitive to the
unique factual situation in Criden.8 9 The most cogent arguments in
favor of a journalist privilege emanate directly from a first amendment
protected interest in newsgathering. 90 Confidentiality of sources en-
courages informants to give information and, consequently, aids the
press in its newsgathering function. 91 More so than other relationships
in which confidentiality is protected, e.g., attorney-client, or physician-
patient, where the privilege is created to protect the individual, 92 the
journalist privilege is not primarily intended to protect the informant
or the newsman but rather to create conditions where the news can
85. See note 43 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that at the
very least, Branzburg provides clear guidance with respect to a journalist's privi-
lege before a grand jury. Id. Mr. Justice White said in his Branzburg opinion:
"The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury
subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an investiga-
tion into the commission of crime." 408 U.S. at 682 (emphasis added).
Justice Powell's concurring opinion specifically criticized the qualified privi-
lege proposed by Justice Stewart because he felt it placed too heavy a burden
of justification on the government and consequently, would hinder the legiti-
mate, performance of the grand jury. 408 U.S. at 710 n.0 (Powell, J., con-
curring).
86. Compare notes 48-53 and accompanying text supra with notes 39 supra.
The Branzburg court held that a journalist before a grand jury had no special
testimonial privilege. See note 31 supra.
In contrast, the Criden court granted a qualified testimonial privilege to
newsmen appearing before a grand jury and the party objecting to the privilege
was required to show cause as to why it should give way. See note 66 and
accompanying text supra.
87. See notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
88. See note 23 supra.
89. See note 7 supra.
90. See note 30 supra.
91. See note 66 supra.
92. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra. Wignore notes that the
policy behind the attorney-client privilege is to promote freedom of consultation
between legal advisors and their clients. J. WGMORE, supra note 12, at 545.
Although society does receive some indirect benefits from the free flow of in-
formation between attorney and client, the privilege exists to foster the ac-
cessibility of legal counsel for individuals. See id. Unlike the situation in
an attorney-client relationship, where the individual is compelled to talk to an
attorney in order to receive fair treatment in the courts, the informant involved
in a journalist's privilege voluntarily seeks out the newsman, or at least is not
compelled by the threat of any personal adverse consequences. In addition,
when an indvidual gives information to a journalist, he is seeking publication
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reach the public. 93 It is submitted, therefore, that while exercise of the
privilege may be personal to the journalist, the underlying rationale
of the privilege is based on societal interests. 4 Consequently, where
either of the parties breaks the confidence, as was the situation in
Criden, the privilege no longer serves to facilitate this broad societal
interest of dissemination of information. With the underlying rationale
gone, to grant the privilege gives the journalist more rights than other
members of society. 95 As the Criden court noted, "the rule follows
where its reason leads; where the reason stops, there stops the rule." 96
The most immediate impact of Criden is that it standardizes
through its balancing test the treatment of journalists' privilege in both
criminal and civil contexts. 07 However, in so doing, the Criden court
has given impetus to the notion that the press, and those who claim
status as members of the press, have acquired legal rights beyond those
of ordinary citizens.98 The American press has flourished for over two
93. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 690. It is further submitted that
even without any historical constitutional protection for informants, the press
has flourished. Id. at 698-99. As the Branzburg court stated: "The existing
constitutional rules have not been a serious obstacle to either the development
or the retention of confidential news sources by the press." Id. at 699.
94. See note 102 infra.
95. See note 25 supra; note 162 infra.
96. 663 F.2d at 356, citing United States v. Schreiker, 599 F.2d 534, 537
(3d Cir. 1979).
97. For a discussion of the differences between Branzburg and Criden, see
note 87 supra.
98. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 735, 795 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). Chief Justice Burger recently asserted that the free press clause
does not support a preferred, institutional press position because the colonial
concept of freedom of the press did not contemplate limiting that freedom to
any one group. Id. at 798-99 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Rejecting the
argument that the founding fathers must have intended a preferred press, or
else the free press clause is merely a reiteration of the free speech clause, Chief
Justice Burger concluded that freedom of speech protects the expression of
ideas and beliefs while the freedom of the press protects the broad, permanent
dissemination of those ideas and beliefs. Id. at 799-800 (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring). The Chief Justice further noted that most pre-first amendment commen-
tators employed the term "freedom of speech" synonymously with "freedom
of the press." Id., citing L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 174 (1960).
The characterization of the press may be approached along two lines.
Lange, supra note 13, at 98-103.
The "structural" approach requires a determination of who belongs to the
organized, "official" press, and therefore involves making distinctions between
the certified journalist and lone pamphleteer. Id. at 100. The functional
approach, however, requires defining the press in terms of the function it per-
forms, i.e. providing information. Id. at 102. As such, the freedom of the
press would be a personal right. See Lowell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)
("The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication
which affords a vehicle of information and opinion").
It is submitted that while traditional constitutional doctrine holds that the
freedom of the press is a fundamental personal right, creating an institutional
press involves difficulties of determining who is a member of the press. See
note 32 supra.
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hundred years under the protective gaze of the first amendment, and
has done so without any preferred institutional status.99 However, over
the years, the press has constantly clamored for special rights and priv-
ileges, 00 but until the advent of the corporate media, had achieved little
success. 10' The constitutional theory underlying the first amendment is
that it gives personal and not institutional rights.10 2 As such, Criden is
a step toward a new definition of the press which affords it exclusive
privileges and unjustifiably destroys the egalitarian design of the
Constitution. 03
On a more concrete level, by requiring a specific showing of need
before a journalist can be compelled to reveal his sources, the Criden
decision should mitigate the press' oft cited fear that the government
can go on a "fishing expedition" 104 or use the press as an investigatory
tool for law enforcement. 0 5 However, the trade-off is that the legitimate
needs of unpopular criminal defendants in highly publicized and
politically sensitive trials could easily be disrupted by a reporter's claim
of confidentiality.
The Third Circuit in Criden has taken the position of Justice
Stewart in his Branzburg dissent.' 06 However, the actual effect upon
the relationship between the reporter and his confidential source will
be minimal. The reporter cannot absolutely promise his source that
99. See Barron, supra note 44, at 1003-06. Professor Barron notes that
there is a movement to give a special constitutional status to the press. Id. at
1007. In this view, the first amendment is not a mandate that the freedom of
the press is protected, but that the press shall be free from the law. Id.
Mr. Justice Stewart in his celebrated lecture at Yale Law School articulated
the idea that the press clause of the Constitution confers unique protection on
the press in a way that is superior to the rights afforded to the general popula-
tion by the free speech clause. See Stewart, supra note 35.
The theory that the free press clause created a preferred institutional press
arises from two fundamental propositions: 1) the free press clause effects a
separation of the press from the government and government interference; and
2) the rights of the press derive from its institutional status and not from any
obligation to inform the public. Bezanson, supra note 13.
Despite the movement toward a preferred press, the Supreme Court has
never squarely faced the issue. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
798 & n.3 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
100. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 682-85.
101. For a discussion of the various cases where the institutional press has
petitioned the Supreme Court for special status, see note 61 supra.
102. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("The purpose of the Constitution was not to erect the press into
a privileged institution but to protect all persons in their right to print what
they will, as well as to utter it .... The liberty of the press is no greater and
no less . . . than the liberty of every citizen of the republic").
103. See notes 98 & 102 supra.
104. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 744 n.34 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
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there will be no legal compulsion to breach the vow of confidence. 10 7
In the final analysis, a reporter knowing the limitations of his privilege,
must be careful not to overstep its bounds, and if he promises more
than he can safely deliver, he must bear the burden.108
Thomas G. Long
107. 633 F.2d at 359-60. The only way a reporter could be completely
sure that there would be no legal compulsion to reveal his sources would be if
reporters were granted an absolute privilege. 408 U.S. at 702 n.39.
108. The American Newspaper Guild's Code of Ethics includes the follow-
ing canon: "That newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose
sources of confidential information in court or before other judicial or investi-
gatory bodies . . . " D'Alemberte, supra note 12, at 315.
It would thus appear, barring the adoption of an absolute privilege, that
journalists will continue to face confrontation with the contempt powers of
governmental bodies should they adhere to their own code of ethics. J. BARRON
& C. DIENES, supra note 13, at 414.
20




PENNSYLVANIA'S POSTJUDGMENT GARNISHMENT PROCEDURES
VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS AND SUPREMACY CLAUSES.
Finberg v. Sullivan (1980)
Sterling Consumer Discount Co. (Sterling) obtained a default judg-
ment against Beatrice Finberg (Finberg) 1 in the Court of Common
Pleas for Philadelphia County.2 Sterling immediately moved to ex-
ecute on the judgment pursuant to Pennsylvania's postjudgment garnish-
ment procedures.3  Consequently, Finberg's checking and savings
accounts 4 were attached,5 despite the fact that the monies deposited
in these accounts were funds entirely exempt from attachment and
garnishment under both state and federal law.6
1. Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 51 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc). The
plaintiff, Beatrice Finberg, is a 68 year-old widow whose only source of income
was social security benefits; she was sued by Sterling to enforce a debt. Id.
2. Sterling Consumer Discount Co. v. Finberg, No. 5678 (C.P. Phila. Cty.
Oct. 25, 1977). See Finberg v. Sullivan, 461 F. Supp. 253, 255 (E.D. Pa. 1978),
vacated and remanded, 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc).
3. See PA. R. CIv. P. 3103, 3108(d), 3111, 3140(a). [The Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure are codified at Title 42, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.] Sterling
initiated the garnishment proceedings by filing a praecipe for a writ of execution
with the Prothonotary of Philadelphia County. 461 F. Supp. at 255. See PA.
R. Civ. P. 3103(a). The writ named Finberg as the defendant and Philadelphia
National Bank (PNB) as the garnishee. 461 F. Supp. at 255. The writ was
transmitted to the Sheriff of Philadelphia County pursuant to rule 3103(e). Id.
Service of the writ was made to PNB on Nov. 3, 1977 pursuant to rules 3108
and 3111. Id. The next day, a copy of the writ was forwarded by PNB to
Finberg in accordance with rule 3140(a) and was received by Finberg on Nov.
7, 1977. Id. at 255. On Nov. 18, 1977, a copy of PNB's response to Sterling's
interrogatories was furnished to Finberg as required by rule 3140(b). Id. For a
discussion of the distinctions between attachment and garnishment, see note 5
infra.
4. 634 F.2d at 52. The accounts held a total of $550, all of which repre-
sented social security benefit payments. Id. The accounts were held by PNB.
461 F. Supp. at 255.
5. The Finberg court distinguished garnishment from attachment. 634 F.2d
at 52 n.1. Garnishment was defined as the entire "process of execution against
property held by someone other than the debtor." Id. In Finberg, Sterling
initiated a garnishment of the bank accounts that Finberg maintained at PNB
in order to execute its judgment against Finberg. Id. at 52. Attachment was
defined as "the seizure imposed on property held by a garnishee at the beginning
of the garnishment process." Id. at 52 n.1. After the garnishment proceedings
were initiated, service of a writ of execution was made on PNB. Id. at 52. This
service had the effect of enjoining PNB from making any payments out of Fin-
berg's accounts. Id. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure involved in this process, see note 3 supra.
6. 634 F.2d at 52. Two exemptions were applicable to Finberg: the Social
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Finberg encountered difficulties in having the exempted funds re-
leased from attachment because of the delay encountered in obtaining
court orders for the release, taking depositions for trial, and securing
the final release of funds by the garnishee.7 As a result of these diffi-
culties and delays, Finberg brought a class action 8 seeking a declaratory
judgment that Pennsylvania's postjudgment garnishment procedures
were unconstitutional under the due process 9 and supremacy clauses.' 0
On appeal from the district court order granting summary judgment
for the defendant," the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
exemption under Pennsylvania law. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2161 (Purdon
1967), revised and codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8123 (Purdon 1979).
The Social Security Act, provides that "none of the moneys paid or payable or
rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attach-
ment, garnishment, or other legal process ... ." 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
Because Finberg's bank accounts contained social security payments, they were
exempt from execution under the Social Security Act. Id. §§ 301-1399 (1976).
In addition, Pennsylvania law grants a $300 exemption to a class of debtors
which includes Finberg. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2161 (Purdon 1967), revised
and codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8123 (Purdon 1979). For a discussion
of why the Third Circuit found the procedures which allowed the attachment
of exempt funds to be unconstitutional, see notes 67-91 and accompanying text
infra.
7. 634 F.2d at 52. Having received no notice that her accounts, attached
on Nov. 3, 1977, might be exempt from garnishment, Finberg filed a petition
in the court of common pleas on Nov. 18, 1977, in order to claim her exemption.
Id. Consequently, on Dec. 8, recognizing the Pennsylvania exemption, the court
released $300 of Finberg's funds from the attached account. Id., citing 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8123 (Purdon 1979). See note 6 supra. On April 11, 1978,
after Finberg's deposition was taken to determine the basis of her claimed social
security exemption, Sterling agreed to release the remaining $250 in Finberg's
accounts. 634 F.2d at 52. See 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976); note 6 supra. The court
ordered the release on April 25, 1978. Id. Finally, on May 30, 1978, PNB
released $226.50, retaining $23.50 as a service charge to cover its expenses re-
sulting from the garnishment. 461 F. Supp. at 255.
8. 461 F. Supp. at 255-56. The complaint sought relief for Finberg and
for two classes of similarly situated plaintiffs. Id. The present action named
Sterling, John A. Sullivan, Sheriff of Philadelphia County, and Americo V.
Cortese, Prothonotary of Philadelphia County as defendants. 634 F.2d at 52.
For a discussion of the roles of defendants Sterling and Sullivan in the instant
case, see note 3 supra.
9. 634 F.2d at 52-53. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
provides: "No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. 634 F.2d at 52-53. The supremacy clause states that: "This Constitution,
and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof;
. . . shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; ..... " U.S. CONST. art. VI.
11. 461 F. Supp. at 263. Specifically, the district court granted the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment on each of the declaratory judgment
claims and denied class certification. Id. at 257, 263. However, the court
awarded Finberg $23.50 plus interest against defendant Sterling. Id. at 263.
This amount had been retained by PNB as a service charge. Id. See note 7
supra.
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Circuit, sitting en banc, 12 vacated 13 and remanded, holding that Penn-
sylvania's postjudgment garnishment procedures were violative of both
the due process and the supremacy clauses. Finberg v. Sullivan, 634
F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc).
The concept of procedural due process has its roots in the United
States Supreme Court's century old statement that "[p]arties whose rights
are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may
enjoy that right they must first be notified." 14 Prior to 1969,15 when
an ex parte provisional remedy - a remedy obtained by a creditor prior
to judgment 16 - deprived the debtor of his property rights, the Supreme
Court interpreted the due process clause to require that he be given
an opportunity for a hearing at some stage of the garnishment pro-
ceedings. 17 However, the Court began to expand the scope of a debtor's
due process rights with respect to these provisional remedies 18 in Snia-
dach v. Family Finance Corp.19
12. The case was heard on Nov. 15, 1979 before Chief Judge Seitz, Circuit
Judge Aldisert, and District Judge Teitelbaum. The case was reargued on Apr.
28, 1980 before Chief Judge Seitz and Circuit Judges Aldisert, Adams, Gibbons,
Rosenn, Weis, Garth, Higginbotham, and Sloviter. Chief Judge Seitz delivered
the opinion of the court. Judges Aldisert and Weis filed dissenting opinions.
13. The court also vacated the district court's order denying class certifica-
tion. 634 F.2d at 64.
14. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1864). Relying upon
Baldwin, the Court has more recently stated that "[1]t is equally fundamental
that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard 'must be granted at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 80 (1972), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). For a
discussion of Fuentes, see notes 23-24 and accompanying text infra.
15. In 1969, the Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). For a discussion of Sniadach,
see notes 20-22 and accompanying text infra.
16. In the context of debtor-creditor relationships, a provisional remedy is
one "allowing a creditor to 'take possession of a debtor's property pending final
resolution of the dispute." Alderman, Default Judgments and Postjudgment
Remedies Meet the Constitution: Effectuating Sniadach and its Pogeny, 65 GEO.
L.J. 1, 1 (footnote omitted). These provisional remedies are typically of an ex
parte nature and are referred to as prejudgment remedies since they are utilized
prior to the judicial determination of the debt. See Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
17. Alderman, supra note 16, at 6 & n.25. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Cassel-
berry, 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1949).
18. For a definition of the term provisional remedy, see note 16 supra.
19. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Subsequent due process cases in the prejudgment
garnishment area include: North Ga. Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S.
601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); and Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 20-34 and
accompanying text infra. For a further analysis of these cases, see Alderman,
supra note 16, at 6-12; Dunham, Post-Judgment Seizures: Does Due Process
Require Notice and Hearing?, 21 S.D. L. REV. 78, 88-92 (1976); Greenfield, A
Constitutional Limitation on 'the Enforcement of Judgments - Due Process and
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The Sniadach Court held that, due to the statute's lack of notice
and opportunity for a hearing prior to the garnishment of the debtor's
wages, Wisconsin's prejudgment garnishment procedure was violative
of the due process clause.2 0 The Court found that, although the wage
freeze was only temporary, 21 it "may as a practical matter drive a wage-
earning family to the wall." 22 Three years after Sniadach, in Fuentes
v. Shevin,2 3 the Court extended the holding of Sniadach to include the
replevin of property other than wages, by holding that the Constitution
requires that prejudgment replevin statutes provide for preseizure notice
and hearing even where the creditor claimed an interest in the property
sought to be attached.
24
20. 395 U.S. at 342. Under the Wisconsin statute, a court clerk had issued
a summons at the request of the creditor. Id. at 338. The clerk served notice
on the garnishee who was then authorized to withhold one-half of the wages
due the debtor. Id. at 338 n.l. Although the debtor was served with notice of
the garnishment on the same day as the garnishee, the statute allowed 10 days
for such service to be effectuated. Id. at 338. If the debtor had prevailed on
the merits in the suit on the debt, his wages could have been unfrozen but dur-
ing the interim the debtor was deprived of his earned wages. Id. at 338-39.
21. Id. at 339. For a discussion of the Wisconsin garnishment process, see
note 20 supra.
22. 395 U.S. at 341-42 (footnote omitted).
23. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In Fuentes, the debtors were purchasers of house-
hold goods under conditional sales contracts; the creditor retained title to the
goods while the debtor was entitled to possession pending full payment. Id. at
70. The challenged Florida and Pennsylvania statutes authorized the prejudg-
ment summary seizure of goods and chattels upon an ex parte application with-
out a provision for preseizure notice and an opportunity for a preseizure hearing.
Id. at 69-78. The laws in question allowed for the issuance of a writ of replevin
upon the bare assertion of the patty seeking the writ that he was entitled to the
goods. Id. at 73, 76. Under Florida's procedures, the applicant was required
only to file a complaint to initiate an action for repossession, claim entitlement
to the goods in a conclusory manner, and post a security bond to cover the de-
fendant's expenses should the debtor prevail in the action. Id. at 73. Under
the Pennsylvania statute, a party could obtain a prejudgment writ of replevin
in a manner similar to that used in Florida. Id. at 76. While the Florida
statute provided for the eventual postseizure opportunity for a hearing at the
tr!ial for repossession, the Pennsylvania law did not require the creditor to in-
itiate an action for repossession. Id. at 75, 77. Consequently the Pennsylvania
law did not require that there ever be an opportunity for a hearing on the merits
of the conflicting possession claims. Id. at 77.
24. Id. at 80-93. The statutes declared unconstitutional in Fuentes, unlike
the statute in Sniadach, permitted the prejudgment replevin of property other
than wages. Id. at 73-78. The Fuentes Court relied on Sniadach in its state-
ment that "it is now well settled that a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of
property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 84-85 (citations omitted). Emphasizing its position, the Court stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day,
10-day, or 50-day deprivations of property. Any significiant taking of
property by the State is within the purview of the Due Process Clause.
While the length and consequent severity of a deprivation may be
another factor to weigh in determining the appropriate form of hear-
ing, it is not decisive of the basic right to a prior hearing of some kind.
Id. at 86.
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However, only two more years passed before the Supreme Court,
in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,25 limited the holding of Fuentes by
upholding Louisiana's ex parte sequestration procedure.2 6 The Mitchell
Court found these procedures to be constitutionally permissible despite
the fact that they postponed notice and an opportunity to be heard
until after the deprivation.27 In so finding, the Court adopted a
balancing of interests approach which weighed the competing in-
terests of the debtor in reducing the risk of a wrongful deprivation
of his property and the creditor who had retained a vendor's lien to
secure the unpaid balance of the purchase price.2 8 In applying this
test, the Mitchell Court held that due process may be satisfied without
a prior hearing so long as "adequate procedural safeguards" to protect
the debtor are present.
2 9
25. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). The basic facts of Mitchell are identical to
Fuentes. For a discussion of Fuentes, see notes 23-24 and accompanying text
supra. As in Fuentes, the debtors in Mitchell were purchasers of household
goods under a conditional sales contract in which the creditor retained a
vendor's lien on the goods. 416 U.S. at 601-02. Under the Louisiana seques-
tration provisions, Grant filed suit against Mitchell for the undue and unpaid
balance of the purchase price paid for the items. Id. at 601. The complaint
further alleged that a writ of sequestration should issue to seize the merchandise
pending the outcome of the suit and asserted that Grant had reason to believe
that Mitchell would "encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of the merchan-
dise . . . during the pendency of [the] proceedings." Id. at 602. Based on
this sworn petition and affidavit, and without notice or hearing to Mitchell,
a judge ordered the constable of the court to seize and take into his possession
the merchandise described in the petition. Id. This order was made after
Grant, pursuant to the Louisiana statute, posted a bond to protect the alleged
debtor against damage or expense. Id. at 602, 608.
26. 416 U.S. at 619-20. The sequestration procedure in Mitchell was
essentially the same as replevin; it was utilized to attach personal property in
the hands of the debtor by a creditor who had retained a vendor's lien in the
goods. Id. at 601-05. For a discussion of the sequestration procedures litigated
in Mitchell, see note 25 supra. For a discussion of the replevin procedures
considered in Fuentes, see note 23 supra. In upholding the sequestration pro-
cedure, the Mitchell Court revitalized the traditional pre-Sniadach due process
concepts. 416 U.S. at 609. The pre-Sniadach cases had held that due process
required only that there be an opportunity for a hearing at some stage of the
garnishment proceedings. See note 17 and accompanying text supra. While
Sniadach and Fuentes required preseizure notice and an opportunity for a
hearing, Mitchell upheld a statute which provided only for postseizure pro-
cedural due process rights in the prejudgment context. Compare notes 19-24
and accompanying text supra (Sniadach and Fuentes) with note 25 and accom-
panying text supra; notes 27-29 and accompanying text infra (Mitchell).
27. 416 U.S. at 602-03.
28. Id. at 604-09. Since both the debtor and creditor had an interest in
the property, the Court found it necessary to balance the risk to the debtor of
a wrongful deprivation of his property, with the risk to the creditor of con-
tinued use, destruction, or concealment of the goods by the debtor, or that the
goods may be transferred by the debtor prior to execution. Id.
29. Id. at 608-10. The Court found that the creditor's security interest in
the property, the judicial supervision of the seizure of property, the requirement
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In North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,30 the Supreme
Court seemed to revert to the rule of Fuentes 8l by holding that, even
within a commercial setting,82 the adequate procedural safeguards re-
quired by the due process clause mandated preseizure notice and hearing
in order to prevent the wrongful deprivation of property.8 3 Relying
him to the property, and the provision for a prompt postseizure hearing for
the dissolution of the writ were significant to its finding that there were ade-
quate postseizure procedural safeguards to hedge against the wrongful depriva-
tion of the debtor's property even though preseizure procedural safeguards were
not available to the debtor. Id. at 607-10, 614-17. Justice White's majority
opinion distinguished Sniadach and Fuentes on the ground that postseizure
procedures such as those found in Mitchell were not present. Id. at 614-16.
However, Justices Powell, Stewart, Douglas, and Marshall viewed Mitchell as
overruling Fuentes. Id. at 623 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 634 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). See also id. at 636 (Brennan, I., dissenting); North Ga. Finishing
Co. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at
615-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see North Ga. Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. at 608 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart observed: "It is
gratifying to note that my report of the demise of Fuentes v. Shevin ... seems
to have been greatly exaggerated." Id.
30. 419 U.S. 601 (1975). In Di-Chem, the corporate debtor's bank account
was seized after the creditor, Di-Chem, filed suit alleging an indebtedness for
goods sold and delivered. Id. at 604. Pursuant to the Georgia garnishment
statute, the bank account was seized without prior notice and an opportunity
to be heard. Id. Under the Georgia statute, a writ of garnishment was issuable
by a court clerk on an affidavit containing only conclusory allegations, without
judicial supervision. Id. The law provided for the dissolution of the garnish-
ment only when the debtor posted a security bond to cover any judgment
against him. Id. For a discussion of the Court's analysis of these procedures,
see notes 33-34 and accompanying text infra.
31. Compare Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) and
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600 (1974). See notes 19-29 and accompanying text supra.
32. 419 U.S. at 608. Commentators had believed that Di-Chem would be
distinguished from Sniadach because Di-Chem's commercial setting involved
parties of equal bargaining power. Alderman, supra note 16, at 11 &c nn.62-63.
Di-Chem involved the garnishment of a corporation's bank account rather than
a consumer's household necessities. See 419 U.S. at 601. However, the Court
dispelled this notion in Di-Chem. Id. at 608.
33. 419 U.S. at 607. According to the Court, the garnishment statute had
none of the saving characteristics of the statute upheld in Mitchell which
allowed postseizure notice and a postseizure hearing. Id. The Court enu-
merated six deficiencies of the Georgia procedures in Di-Chem:
[1] The writ of garnishment [was] issuable on the affidavit of the
creditor or his attorney, and the latter need not have had personal
knowledge of the facts. . . . [2] The affidavit . . . need contain only
conclusory allegations. [3] The writ is issuable . . . by the court clerk,
without participation by a judge. [4] Upon service of the writ, the
debtor is deprived of the use of the property in the hands of the
garnishee . . . [5] There is no provision for an early hearing at which
the creditor would be required to demonstrate at least probable cause
for the garnishment. [6] Indeed, it would appear that without the
filing of a bond the defendant debtor's challenge to the garnishment
will not be entertained, whatever the grounds may be.
Id. (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
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on the Mitchell rationale, the Court found that Georgia's postseizure
process did not provide "adequate procedural safeguards" and therefore
found them to be violative of the due process clause.34
The process due a judgment debtor in a postjudgment context
differs from the procedures accorded to a prejudgment debtor.35 While
the Supreme Court recognized the applicability of the due process clause
to postjudgment procedures in Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia
Press, Inc.,3 6 the Court held that there was no constitutional mandate
for notice and a hearing prior to postjudgment seizure.3 7 The Endi-
cott Court reasoned that since the judgment debtor had already been
granted an opportunity to be heard, he should be on constructive" 'no-
tice of what will follow,' no further notice being 'necessary to advance
justice.' "38
However, the case of Griffin v. Griffin 39 casts doubt on the Endicott
principle.40 In Griffin, the Court held that a New York statute which
provided for an ex parte motion seeking a judgment for accrued ali-
mony installments without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard
34. Id. at 606-07. See Dunham, supra note 19, at 91-92; note 33 and
accompanying text supra. While Sniadach and Fuentes required notice and a
hearing before a prejudgment seizure, the Court in Di-Chem focused mainly
on the inadequate safeguards against mistaken repossession. See 419 U.S. at
606; Dunham, supra, at 92. The cumulative reading of Sniadach and its
progeny suggests a requirement of either preseizure notice and hearing or an
ex parte procedure similar to that involved in Mitchell in which "adequate"
procedural safeguards are provided. Alderman, supra note 16, at 12 & n.66.
35. See Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 285
(1924); notes 36-38 and accompanying text infra.
36. 266 U.S. 285 (1924).
37. Id. at 288-90. The Court upheld a New York statute which permitted
the garnishment of 10% of a judgment debtor's wages, despite the absence of
notice and a hearing prior to the garnishment. Id.
38. Id. at 288 (citations omitted). In its full text, the Court stated:
[T]he established rules of our system of jurisprudence do not require
that a defendant who has been granted an opportunity to be heard
and has had his day in court, should, after a judgment has been ren-
dered against him, have a further notice and hearing before supple-
mental proceedings are taken to reach his property in satisfaction of
the judgment. Thus, in the absence of a statutory requirement, it is
not essential that he be given notice before the issuance of an execu-
tion against his tangible property; after the rendition of the judgment
he must take "notice of what will follow," no further notice being
"necessary to advance justice."
Id. (citations omitted). See also Dunham, supra note 19, at 79.
39. 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
40. See Dunham, supra note 19, at 80-88; Greenfield, supra note 19, at 893.
For a discussion of the Finberg majority's disposition of the Endicott principle,
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violated the due process clause.41 The Griffin Court ruled that the
entry of judgment would cut off the husband's right to a retroactive
modification of the decree,42 stating that
[w]hile it is undoubtedly true that the [original] decree
gave [the husband] notice ...that further proceedings might
be taken.... we find this no ground for saying that due process
does not require further notice of the time and place of such
further proceedings, inasmuch as they undertook substantially
to affect his rights in ways in which the [original] decree did
not.
43
Since Griffin, the Supreme Court has twice declined to consider
whether Endicott should be overruled,44 thereby retaining the apparent
41. 327 U.S. at 220. Under New York law, an alimony decree could not
be enforced until a judgment for the amount of the accrued but unpaid alimony
had been docketed as a judgment. Id. at 227.
42. Id. The husband could have defended against docketing the judgment
on the ground that the alimony decree should have been modified because
of the death or remarriage of the wife, discharge of the obligation by payment,
or changed circumstances justifying a reduction of alimony already accrued. Id.
43. Id. at 229 (footnote omitted). However, the Court did not discuss or
cite Endicott. For a discussion of Endicott, see notes 36-38 and accompanying
text supra.
44. Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968) (three-judge court),
appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 825 (1969) (per curiam); Knight v. DeMarcus, 102
Ariz. 105, 425 P.2d 837, cert. granted sub nom. Hanner v. DeMarcus, 389 U.S,
926 (1976), cert. dismissed, 390 U.S. 736 (1968) (per curiam).
In Hanner, four justices dissented from the dismissal of certiorari, stating
that the Court should have decided whether or not Endicott should be over-
ruled; three of them argued that Endicott should be formally overruled in
light of several subsequent Supreme Court decisions. 390 U.S. at 736 (Douglas,
J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari). See also id. at 742 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of certiorari). Justice Douglas noted that the Endicott
principle had never been reaffirmed by the Court. Id. at 740 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of certiorari). justice Douglas also suggested that
Griffin rejected the constructive notice rationale of Endicott. Id. at 741 (Doug-
las, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari). In addition, he believed that
Griffin pointed the way towards the demands of due process, required in
Hanner, where the plaintiff's property was executed against subsequent to a
judgment or a debt without adequate notice. Justice Douglas felt that the
execution and the judicial sale "substantially effected" the property owner's
rights in ways in which the original judgment on the debt did not. Id. at 742
(Douglas, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari), quoting Griffin v. Griffin,
327 U.S. at 229. Justice Douglas noted that substantial property rights were
at stake at further proceedings in Griffin "because state law entitled the debtor
to reduce his debt on proof of changed circumstances; in the instant case
substantial property rights were at stake because state law gave the debtor the
right to select property to be levied on ... [thereby] prevent[ing the creditor]
from seizing property worth $20,000 or $40,000.... " to satisfy a judgment
slightly more than $5,000. Id. The dissent also noted the recent expansion
of the scope of the notice requirement as well as the Court's new approach to
the adequacy of notice. 390 U.S. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting from dismissal
of certiorari), citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 385 U.S. 545 (1965) (notice of pending
adoption proceedings must be given to natural father); Lambert v. California,
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inconsistency between the two cases.4 5 A number of federal and state
courts have attempted to address the issue of the scope of due process
requirements in the area of postjudgment execution procedures.4 6 Most
of the decisions like Endicott, have denied the right to preseizure no-
tice and hearing for judgment debtors, 47 although some courts have
355 U.S. 255 (1957) (notice required where law placed a duty on a felon to
register; due process limits the general rule that ignorance of the law will not
excuse); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956) (notice of a property
tax foreclosure in which notice was given by mail, a posting at the post office,
and publication in local newspapers was inadequate where the taxpayer was
known to be incompetent and without the protection of a guardian); Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank g8 Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (notice given by trustee
pursuant to a judicial settlement of its accounts through newspaper publica-
tions was inadequate with respect to known present beneficiaries of a known
place of residence; "The means employed must be such as one desirous of
actually informing the [opposing party] might reasonably adopt to accomplish
it").
Justice Douglas went on to reiterate the Supreme Court's view that:
[e]ngrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice.
Notice is sometimes essential so that the citizen has a chance to defend
charges. Notice is required before property interests are disturbed,
before assessments are made, before penalties are assessed. Notice is
required in a myriad of situations where a penalty or forfeiture might
be suffered for mere failure to act.
390 U.S. at 741 n.3 (Douglas, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari), quoting
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. at 228.
In Moya, the Court dismissed an appeal from a decision which had relied
on Endicott; the judgment sustained the constitutionality of a postjudgment
garnishment statute which required neither notice nor an opportunity for the
judgment debtor to be heard. 395 U.S. at 825. It is interesting to note that
the dismissal of Moya came only a few days after the prejudgment garnishment
decision in Sniadach. See Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 337 (Jun. 9, 1969); Moya v.
DeBaca, 395 U.S. at 825 (Jun. 23, 1969). While Justices Harlan and Brennan
would have remanded the case in light of Sniadach, Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Douglas, who had dissented from the dismissal of certiorari in Hanner,
did not join in the dissent. See 395 U.S. at 825 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For
a discussion of the effects of Hanner and Moya on the inconsistency between
Endicott and Griffin, see Kennedy, Due Process Limitations on Creditor's Rem-
edies: Some Reflections on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 19 AM. U.L. REV.
158, 173-76 (1969-70); notes 103-04 and accompanying text infra.
45. See note 40 and accompanying text supra. One possible distinction
between Endicott and Griffith could be that in Endicott the judgment debtor
should expect prompt execution once his indebtedness has been adjudicated.
In Griffith, the ex-wife was not entitled to seek the enforcement of an alimony
decree until a judgment had been docketed. See note 41 supra. Since many
years may intervene before the ex-husband fails to keep up with his payments,
the possibility of changed circumstances should be able to be asserted before
judgment is entered against him. For a discussion of other possible distinctions
between Endicott and Griffith, see Dunham, supra note 19, at 80-88.
46. See notes 47-66 and accompanying text infra.
47. See Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 539 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 949 (1977) (Florida's postjudgment garnishment procedures were
not unconstitutional since they provided for a hearing within two weeks after
the judgment debtor claimed his exemption); First Nat'l Bank v. Hasty, 410
F. Supp. 482 (E. D. Mich. 1976) (due process does not require a preseizure
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ruled to the contrary.48 Notably, in three cases which have dealt with
statutory exemptions similar to those in Finberg, each has found that,
at a minimum, due process requires adequate postseizure protections. 49
attachment on the authority of Mitchell); Halperin v. Austin, 385 F. Supp.
1009 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (three-judge court) (court relied on Endicott and held
that a "divorce decree and alimony judgment as a basis for the garnishment
establishes 'the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying claim
against' plaintiff before he was deprived of his property"; "Sniadach and its
progeny should be limited to prejudgment procedures"); Katz v. Ke Kam Kim,
379 F. Supp. 65 (D. Haw. 1974) (postjudgment wage garnishment constitutional
on the authority of Endicott); Langford v. Tennessee, 356 F. Supp. 1163 (W.D.
Tenn. 1973) (per curiam) (three-judge court) (sustained statute which did not
provide for a preseizure hearing to determine whether the property to be levied
was exempt from attachment); Moya v. De Baca, 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M.
1968) (three-judge court), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 825 (1969) (per curiam)
(court relied on Endicott and held that garnishment procedures do not violate
due process despite lack of notice and hearing); Knight v. DeMarcus, 102 Ariz.
105, 425 P.2d 837, cert. granted sub nom. Hanner v. DeMarcus, 389 U.S. 926
(1967), cert. dismissed, 390 U.S. 736 (1968) (per curiam) (relying on Endicott);
Phillips v. Bartolomie, 46 Cal. App. 3d 346, 121 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1975) (due
process does not require a hearing prior to levy on a bank account consisting
solely of exempt funds); Raigoza v. Sperl, 34 Cal. App. 3d 560, 110 Cal. Rptr.
296 (1973) (upheld postjudgment garnishment of wages which may be exempt
from execution despite lack of notice and hearing); Wilson v. Grimes, 232 Ga.
388, 207 S.E.2d 5 (1974) (lack of notice and hearing prior to garnishment under
an alimony decree held constitutional); Bittner v. Butts, 514 S.W.2d 556 (Mo.
1974) (no preseizure procedures required under foreign judgment statute); Hehr
v. Tucker, 256 Or. 254, 472 P.2d 797 (1970) (preseizure procedures not required
under foreign judgment statute).
48. Strick Corp. v. Thai Teak Prods. Co., 493 F. Supp. 1210 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(court distinguished district court opinion in Finberg and held that Pennsyl-
vania's garnishment procedure was unconstitutional on the basis of Endicott;
the statute garnished the property of "alter egos" of debtors - parties other
than the judgment debtors who had not had their day in court unlike the
debtor in Endicott); Betts v. Tom, 431 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Haw. 1977) (due
process requires either notice and hearing to judgment debtors before funds
traceable to exempt Aid to Families with Dependent Children grants are gar-
nished or, at a minimum, adequate procedural safeguards and a prompt post-
seizure hearing similar to those found permissable in Mitchell); Vail v. Quinlan,
387 F. Supp. 630, 635 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (use of civil contempt to enforce com-
pliance with an information subpoena was unconstisutional for failure to pro.
vide notice and a proper hearing to judgment debtor; Endicott deemed not
controlling because the deprivation in Vail was a liberty not a property interest);
City Fin. Co. v. Wilson, 238 Ga. 10, 231 S.E.2d 45 (1976) (postjudgment gar-
nishment law held unconstitutional for failure to provide minimum procedural
safeguards similar to those in Mitchell); Salahub v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
41 Or. App. 775, 599 P.2d 1210 (1979) (postjudgment execution statute held
unconstitutional for failure to provide notice of the garnishment of a bank ac-
count consisting solely of exempted funds since prejudgment writ of attachment
did provide such notice); Luskey v. Steffron, Inc., 461 Pa. 305, 336 A.2d 298
(1975), afJ'd on rehearing, 469 Pa. 377, 366 A.2d 223 (1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 968 (1977) (court held unconstitutional Pennsylvania's procedures for the
sale of real property in satisfaction of judgments; the law which permitted notice
by publication in local newspapers and by the posting of handbills on the prop-
erty failed to provide adequate notice; court noted that its decision was con-
trary to the rationale employed in Endicott).
49. Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 539 F.2d 1355, 1368-69 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 949 (1977); Betts v. Tom, 431 F. Supp. 1369, 1377-78 (D.
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In Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp.,5o a judgment debtor challenged
Florida's postjudgment wage garnishment procedure which failed to
provide for notice and an opportunity to be heard to establish the
validity of an exemption claim prior to the garnishment of wages.5 ' In
distinguishing the case from Sniadach on the basis of the pre/post-
judgment issue, the court found that the judgment creditor's interest
was paramount, and therefore denied preseizure notice and a hearing.
5 2
The court concluded, however, that the Florida procedures satisfied
due process requirements because they provided the judgment debtor
with adequate notice 53 and a prompt postseizure hearing.
54
In Raigoza v. Sperl,5 5 a California court sustained the constitu-
tionality of that state's postjudgment wage garnishment procedures even
though the statutes allowed the attachment of exempt wages before a
hearing was held.56 Unlike the court in Brown, the Raigoza court re-
jected the debtor's contention that the rationale of Sniadach and
Fuentes - the Supreme Court's prejudgment cases - should apply.57
Furthermore, the court rejected the debtor's attempts to characterize
the proceedings in which the validity of exemptions were determined
as an entirely new proceeding involving significantly different legal
Haw. 1977); Raigoza v. Sperl, 34 Cal. App. 3d 560, 562-64, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296,
298-299 (1973). For a brief discussion of the holdings of these cases, see notes
47-48 and accompanying text supra.
50. 539 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 949 (1977).
51. 539 F.2d at 1357-58. In Brown the debtor was deprived of her wages
for 17 days before the attachment was dissolved based on her head of the
household exemption. Id. at 1358.
52. Id. at 1363, 1365-68. The Brown court rejected the contention that the
precedential value of Endicott is negligible in view of Griflfin and the pro.
cedural due process analysis of Sniadach and its progeny. Id. at 1364-68. How-
ever, based upon those cases the Court recognized the need to balance the
various interest involved in order to determine the scope of due process re-
quirements in the area of debtor-creditor relationships. Id. For a discussion
of Sniadach and its progeny, see notes 19-34 and accompanying text supra.
53. 539 F.2d at 1368. The court found that, although there was no actual
notice, the debtor is altered to further legal actions based on the notice pro-
vided in the proceedings leading to the underlying judgment. Id. The court
conceded however that the meaningfulness of the notice is dependent on the
debtor's awareness of the need to apply for the exemption. Id.
54. Id. The statute required that the creditor file an affidavit denying the
exemption within two days of the debtor's claim of the exemption. Id.
Furthermore, the hearing was held about two weeks after the writ of garnish-
ment was served on the garnishee. Id.
55. 34 Cal. App. 3d 560, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1973).
56. Id. at 567, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
57. Id. at 567 9: n.9, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 301 &e n.9. For a discussion of
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issues.58 Thus, the court found that the garnishment procedures' 59
failure to provide a preseizure hearing to determine the validity of
exemption claims in the postjudgment context was consistent with the
due process clause; therefore, the postseizure procedures were upheld. 60
Betts v. Tom 61 is a case closely analogous to Finberg in that it
involved the postseizure garnishment of a judgment debtor's bank ac-
count consisting of welfare assistance grants which were exempt from
execution under Hawaii law.62 Applying the balancing test of the
Supreme Court's procedural due process cases, the district court found
the debtor's interest paramount. 63 In finding Hawaii's procedures un-
58. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 567, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 301. The debtor had argued"that the only issue determined in the proceedings that resulted in the judgment
against the debtor was the fact that the debtor owed the creditor a specific
amount of money, but that those proceedings did not decide what the creditor
was entitled to seize to satisfy that judgment." Id. In rejecting this claim the
court stated: "however laudable the policy of legislative exemptions, the policy
is not constitutionally required." Id.
59. For an extended discussion of the garnishment procedures under attack
in Raigoza, see notes 120 & 125 infra.
60. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 568, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 301. The Raigoza decision
was subsequently relied on to deny notice and a hearing where a bank account
consisting solely of exempt federal disability pensions (V.A. and social security)
and AFDC foster care grants were garnished. Phillips v. Bartolomie, 46 Cal.
App. 3d 346, 121 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1975). For a brief discussion of the holdings of
Raigoza and Phillips, see note 47 supra.
61. 431 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Haw. 1977).
62. See 431 F. Supp. at 1369. In Betts, the judgment creditor garnished a
judgment debtor's bank account consisting of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) assistance grants which were exempt from execution under
Hawaii law. Id. at 1370-71. The debtor was denied use of the funds for four
weeks before she was able to have the writ of garnishment quashed. Id. at 1372.
As a result of the inability to use her AFDC grant, Betts experienced great dif-
ficulty in supplying her family with the basic necessities of life. Id. The debtor
subsequently challenged the constitutionality of Hawaii's postjudgment garnish.
ment procedures. Id.
63. Id. at 1375-77. Although the court found that Griffin did not com-
pletely overrule Endicott, it concluded on the basis of Sniadach and its progeny
that, "[t]oday a court should not blindly follow the Endicott-Johnson decision.
• . . [A] new analysis of due process requirements in light of the interests
involved [is justified]." Id. at 1374. In balancing the interests of the creditor,
debtor, and the state, the court found the debtor's interests to prevail. Id. at
1375-76. In doing so, the Betts court concluded that the AFDC grant implies a
recognition by the state that without the use of such funds the recipient would
be unable to supply even the basic needs of his or her children. Id. at 1375.
Therefore, the recipient was found to have a clear and compelling interest in a
preseizure hearing to prevent an erroneous deprivation of these funds. Id. at
1375-76. The court concluded that a "[d]eprivation for even a few days can
often be disastrous" as it would leave a family in immediate danger of falling
below the subsistence level. Id. at 1376. Thus, the debtor's interest was found
to have outweighed that of the creditor in immediately satisfying his judgment.
Id. Finally, the court found the state's interest to be neutral - "The public
interest will be satisfied by any smooth-functioning and well run system of exe-
cution" which employed procedural safeguards to prevent erroneous seizures.
Id. at 1376-77.
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constitutional,64 the court concluded that preseizure notice and hearing
were permissible but not required. 5 The Betts Court found that, at a
minimum, adequate procedural safeguards and a prompt postseizure
hearing were constitutionally mandated.66
Writing for the Finberg majority, Chief Judge Seitz began his
analysis by focusing on the due process issue.67 Having noted that the
Endicott Court had denied the need for any postjudgment/preseizure
notice or hearing on the basis of the constructive notice rationale, 6
the Third Circuit distinguished the present case from Endicott on the
ground that Finberg involved the question of whether due process per-
mitted a judgment debtor to be deprived of property which was statu-
torily exempt from garnishment.69
Next, the Finberg court examined the line of cases granting due
process rights to prejudgment attachments of property ° Conceding
that they were distinguishable from the case at bar, Chief Judge Seitz
nonetheless found them to be controlling.71 The court reasoned that
the attachment of property held by a garnishee, like a prejudgment
seizure, was a provisional remedy presenting similar competing inter-
64. Id. at 1377-78. The court found that the Hawaii procedures created a
substantial risk that an AFDC recipient would be erroneously deprived of his
or her benefits. Id. at 1377. The court noted that the statute made no pro-
vision for preseizure notice and hearing and judicial review but did require that
the creditor file a non-conclusory affidavit attesting to the non-exempt status of
the property garnished. Id.
65. Id. at 1377-78.
66. Id. The Betts Court determined that a system of protections more
limited than preseizure notice and hearing would also decrease the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of the judgment debtor's property. Id. at 1377. Based
on the sequestration statute approved in Mitchell, the Betts court required, at a
minimum, a non-conclusory affidavit signed by a judgment creditor, review by a
judicial officer, and a quick hearing on any claimed AFDC exemption. Id. at
1377-78. For a discussion of Mitchell, see notes 25-29 and accompanying text
supra.
The court noted that its holding was to be read narrowly; the decision dealt
only with the exemption for AFDC grants. 431 F. Supp. at 1378 n.21, 1379. A
subsequent case upheld the same statute as applied to the garnishment of exempt
wages. See Betts v. Coltes, 467 F. Supp. 544 (D. Haw. 1979).
67. 634 F.2d at 56. See notes 68-86 and accompanying text infra.
68. 634 F.2d at 56. For a discussion of Endicott, see notes 35-38 and ac-
companying text supra.
69. 634 F.2d at 56-57.
70. Id. at 57. The court briefly analyzed Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, and
Di-Chem. Id. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 19-34 and accompanying
text supra.
71. 634 F.2d at 57. Chief Judge Seitz noted that the prejudgment cases
differed from the present case in that the creditor had not yet reduced its claim
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ests between a debtor and a creditor. 2 According to the court, this
basic similarity was not altered by the fact that in the present case the
creditor had already obtained a judgment of indebtedness. 7 3 The
court noted that Sterling's judgment represented only an adjudication
of Finberg's debt and was not a transfer of title of Finberg's property
to Sterling.7 4 As Finberg could still defeat the garnishment with other
defenses not adjudicated on the merits, such as exemption claims, the
majority concluded that she still had a protectable interest in the
property, thereby bringing the case within the ambit of the Supreme
Court's prejudgment garnishment decisions.
75
Following the mandate of the Supreme Court's prejudgment cases,
the Finberg court then balanced the competing interests 76 of the cred-
itor 7 and the debtor 7s before considering whether the Pennsylvania
72. Id. at 57-58. Chief Judge Seitz compared the garnishment of Finberg's
bank accounts to a prejudgment seizure in that both were "provisional meas-
ure[s] serving the . . . creditor's interests by preventing transfer or concealment
of property before the creditor can execute a final seizure. [Similarly,] [t]he at-
tachment affects the debtor's interest by depriving her of the continued use of
her property." Id.
73. Id. at 58.
74. Id. The court noted that only upon the completion of the garnishment
process could Sterling obtain the right to seize Finberg's bank accounts. Id.
75, Id. The court stated that the judgment "debtor retains a protectable
interest in the use of her property during the pendency of the creditor's action."
Id. The court also noted that it was taking the same approach to postjudgment
garnishment as did the courts in Brown and Be'tts. Id. For a discussion of
Brown, see notes 50-54 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Betts,
see notes 61-66 and accompanying text supra.
76. 634 F.2d at 58. The balancing test on which the Finberg court relied
for the determination of what procedures are due was clearly enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976):
[Ojur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates
of due process generally requires consideration of these distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
Id. at 319.
For a discussion of the interests of the parties, see notes 77 9: 78 infra.
For a discussion of Chief Judge Seitz's disposition of these competing interests,
see 634 F.2d at 58-62; notes 80-86 and accompanying text infra.
77. 634 F.2d at 58. The court noted two strong interests of the creditor
in the enforcement of the judgment. Id. at 85. First, the creditor, having
already incurred expenses in establishing the debtor's liability, has a strong
interest in the "prompt and inexpensive satisfaction of the debt"; additional
delay and expense will diminish the value of his recovery. Id. Second, the
ability to seize liquid assets in a bank account rather than a levy and judicial
sale of nonmonetary assets is faster and less expensive, hence the ability to
seize these assets advances the creditor's interests. Id. at 58.
78. Id. The court accorded the debtor's interests in the seizure of an in.
dividual bank account great weight. Id. Not only may such accounts contain
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garnishment procedures represented "a fair accommodation of the respec-
tive interests of creditor and debtor." 79 Noting that the plaintiff did
not contend that due process required a hearing prior to seizure,8 0 the
court concluded that the Pennsylvania procedures s were inadequate
for their failure to provide for proper procedural protections after the
attachment was made.8 2 Specifically, Chief Judge Seitz found that the
procedures were constitutionally infirm for their failure to provide for
a prompt postseizure hearing 8 3 as well as adequate postseizure notice
to the judgment debtor.8 4 The court found that the rule which was
applicable to garnishment actions against intangible property imposed
no time limit on the hearing process by which exemption claims could
be validated.8 The notice requirement was found to be inadequate
funds needed for the basic necessities of life, the court reasoned, but the funds
may be covered by exemptions designed to protect the means used to purchase
those basic necessities. Id.
79. Id. For the court's analysis of the procedures in Pennsylvania, see
notes 80-86 and accompanying text infra.
80. 634 F.2d at 59. The court noted that Finberg's contentions focused on
the inadequacy of postseizure procedures to protect property which is subject
to exemptions. Id. at 59. Finberg's due process claim noted the absence of a
prompt postseizure hearing, the lack of adequate postseizure notice, the fact that
the creditor was not required to file an affidavit stating that the writ of execu-
tion would not cause the attachment of exempt property, the lack of a require-
ment for the posting of a bond by the creditor to protect the debtor in the
event exempt property was attached, and the fact that the writ had not been
issued by a judicial officer. Id.
81. PA. R. Civ. P. 206-209, 3121(d), 3123. For a discussion of these pro-
cedures, see notes 83-86 and accompanying text infra.
82. See notes 83-86 and accompanying text infra.
83. 634 F.2d at 59-61. For a more detailed discussion of the court's reason-
ing on the issue of the promptness of postseizure hearing, see note 85 infra.
84. 634 F.2d at 61-62. For a more detailed discussion of the court's
reasoning on the issue of the adequacy of postseizure notice, see note 86 and
accompanying text infra.
85. 634 F.2d at 60. Chief Judge Seitz first noted that the debtor's and
creditor's interests are harmonious on this issue; the debtor has an interest in
promptly asserting her exemptions while the creditor has an interest in delaying
the proceedings only to the extent necessary to frame a response to the debtor's
claims. Id. at 59.
It must be noted that subsequent to the Finberg decision, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court amended Rules 3108, 3123(d), 3142(a), 3252 and adopted Rule
3123.1. See PA. R. Civ. P. 3108, 3123 (d), 3123.1, 3142(a), 3252; Explanatory
Note following Rule 3108; Note following 3123.1; Forms following Rule
3252 (a). For brief discussion of these revisions, see note 98 infra.
The court analyzed rule 3121(d) which allowed a court to "set aside the
writ, service or ley . . . (2) Upon a showing of exemption or immunity of
property from execution." Id., quoting PA. R. Civ. P. 3121(d), The court
noted that the proceedings under this rule were governed by rules 206-209 and
Philadelphia General Civic Rule 140 for Philadelphia County. Id., citing
Misco Int'l Chem., Inc. v. Spritz, 5 Pa. D.&C.3d 779, 782-83 (Phila. Cty C.P.
1977); Hollinger v. Penn Harris Real Estate, Inc., 39 Pa. D.&C.2d 201, 105-06
35
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in failing to provide Finberg with notice of the two exemptions avail-
able to her and the procedures for claiming those exemptions.8 6
(Dauphin Cty. C.P. 1966). The court found that the 15 day period which the
creditor is alloted to file a response to a petition, was too long, even if an
immediate hearing were granted. 634 F.2d at 59. The court found that the
debtor's interest in the release of the funds which were needed for food,
shelter, and other basic needs outweighs the creditor's interests; the creditor
"has little need for this much time in preparing a response" to the relatively
uncomplicated exemption issue. Id. Even after the 15 day response period,
further delays are likely. Id. at 60. The creditor can delay the proceedings
indefinitely by demanding proof on any of the debtor's allegations, and by
taking depositions on disputed issues of fact. Id. The court concluded that
the rules imposed no time on the deposition process, consequently the process
is not by nature swift. Id.
Next, the court focused on rule 3123 which governed the procedures for
claiming a statutory exemption by a judgment debtor. Id. A debtor who
presents an exemption claim to the sheriff could have property equal to the
value of the exemption set aside. PA. R. Civ. P. 3123. Subsection (d) of rule
3123 provided for a 48 hour period in which the judgment debtor could appeal
from the sheriff's appraisal or designaton of property. Id. Contrary to the
district court's findings, the Third Circuit found that the process under rule
3123 was not "prompt." 634 F.2d at 60. For the district court's conclusions,
see 461 F. Supp. at 262. Furthermore, the rule indicated to the court that it
applied to property held by a sheriff in preparation for a judicial sale. Id. In
contrast, the court noted, "in a garnishment action against intangible property,
the property stays in the hands of the garnishee until the court enters ijudgment
against the garnishee." 634 F.2d at 60 (citations omitted). Chief Judge Seitz
noted that Pennsylvania appellate court cases in this area support the proposi-
tion that rule 3123 had no application in the garnishment of a debt. 634 F.2d
at 60 & n.6, citing Bancord v. Parker, 65 Pa. 336, 337-38 (1870). Under the
rules from which rule 3123 was derived, the judgment debtor could claim his
exemption for property held by a garnishee either by notifying the sheriff when
the sheriff served the debtor with the writ of execution, or by asserting the
claim during court proceedings on the garnishment. 634 F.2d at 60 &c n.6,
citing Bancord v. Parker, 65 Pa. at 338; Hild Floor Mach. Co. v. Rudolph, 156
Pa. Super. Ct. 102, 39 A.2d 457 (1944). The court noted that under the rules in
effect as of the time of the Finberg decision the sheriff did not serve the debtor
and the only opportunity for the debtor to assert a claim of exemption was in
court under rule 3121(d). 634 F.2d at 60 n.6. For a discussion of Judge Aldi-
sert's dissenting opinion on this issue, see note 97 and accompanying text infra.
86. 634 F.2d at 62. Chief Judge Seitz noted that the fundamental princi-
ples of due process required timely and adequate notice of the garnishment of
Finberg's bank accounts. Id. at 61-62, citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
&c Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Finberg's contentions were twofold: that the
notice might not reach the debtor and that the notice did not apprise her of the
possible exemptions that might apply to her property. 634 F.2d at 61. Since
notice was received by Finberg from the garnishee in accordance with rules
3140(a) Sc (c), the court refused to decide the issue of lack of timely notice.
Id., citing United States v. Rains, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
As to Finberg's second claim, the court found that the notice was not
"reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to . . . afford [interested
parties] an opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 61-62, citing Mal-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank Sc Tr. Co., 339 U.S. at 314. The court noted the
decision in Memphis Light, Gas Sc Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978), in
which the Supreme Court held that the required content of notice depends
upon the facts of each case. 634 F.2d at 62, citing 436 U.S. at 14 n.15. In
Memphis Light, the Court found that the public utility's notices to customers
that it was terminating their services was violative of due process for failure to
inform the customers of the process for contending terminations. 436 U.S. at
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Finally, the majority found that the Pennsylvania procedures were
in conflict with the Social Security Act which exempts a recipient's
benefits from being attached.8 7 Based upon its disposition of the due
process claims,88 the Finberg court found that under the Pennsylvania
law a judgment debtor was likely to be deprived of his or her exempt
benefits for long periods of time.89 Therefore, viewing the state statute
"as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress," 90 the Third Circuit declared it in-
valid under the supremacy clause.91
Filing an "irreconcilable" dissent,92 Judge Aldisert took issue with
the majority's interpretation of the relevant Supreme Court cases; he
13-15. Therefore, reasoned the Third Circuit, the failure to provide Finberg
with notice of the two exemptions available to her and the procedures for
claiming those exemptions was violative of due process. 634 F.2d at 62. The
court noted that the lack of knowledge of the exemptions might prevent the
debtor from consulting with an attorney before the attachment and thus present
hardships for the debtor, especially where the attached funds are required for
basic necessities. Id. Furthermore, the court found that notice could be pro-
vided as part of the writ of execution, served on the debtor by the garnishee
under rule 3140(a), without imposing undue burdens on either the state or the
creditor. Id. at 62. For a discussion of the dissent's position on the issue of
the adequacy of notice, see note 95 and accompanying text infra.
Finally, the court concluded that while a preliminary affidavit, bond, and
judicial issuance may be desirable, they are not constitutionally required. 634
F.2d at 62, citing Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 539 F.2d at 1369. For a discus-
sion of Brown, see notes 50-54 and accompanying text supra.
87. 634 F.2d at 63, citing 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976). For the relevant text of
§ 407, see note 6 supra.
88. See 634 F.2d at 56-62; notes 67-86 and accompanying text supra.
89. 634 F.2d at 63.
90. 634 F.2d at 63, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
"The test requires an examination of the purposes of the federal law as well as
the effect of the operation of the state law on these purposes." 634 F.2d at 63,
citing Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971). The court first noted that "[t]he
overall objective of the social security system is 'the protection of its bene-
ficiaries from some of the hardships of existence.'" 634 F.2d at 63, quoting
United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 711 (1947). The court found that the ex-
emption of these benefits from legal process furthered this objective by ensuring
uninterrupted use of the benefit funds. 634 F.2d at 63. The court stated that
the effect of the Pennsylvania procedures defeated this purpose by allowing
bank accounts to be attached and frozen without regard to whether they contain
social security funds. Id.
91. 634 F.2d at 62-63. For the text of the supremacy clause, see note 10
supra.
92. 634 F.2d at 64 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert stated: "My
disagreement with the majority is fundamental and all persausive. . . . My
views ... are nadiral to those of the majority; our disagreement, irreconcilable."
Id. Before reaching the constitutional issues, Judge Aldisert stated that the
litigants before the court lacked true adversariness and that Finberg's claim was
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found that the creditor's interest was paramount in the postjudgment
context.9 3  Moreover, Judge Aldisert found that the Pennsylvania
garnishment procedures did provide a judgment debtor with "prompt" 94
funds pursuant to the district court's order. Id. at 64-69 (Aldisert, J., dis-
senting). See 461 F. Supp. at 263. For a discussion of the source of this remain-
ing $23.50, see note 7 supra. However, judge Aldisert found error in the lower
court's denial of class certification. 634 F.2d at 69 (Aldisert, J., dissenting),
citing United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 338 (1980). There-
fore, the judge addressed the due process and supremacy clause questions. 634
F.2d at 69 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
In his dissent, Judge Aldisert noted his "grave reservations . . . about the
implications of [the majority's] action for the federal system." Id. The dissent
noted three considerations which require greater caution than the majority
exercised in its opinion. Id. The majority, contended Judge Aldisert, failed
to follow the Supreme Court's mandate
that federal courts should presume "that the statute will be construed
in such a way as to avoid the constitutional question presented," . . .
and that "state courts may be reluctant to attribute to their legislature
an intention to pass a statute raising constitutional problems, unless
such legislative intent is particularly clear."
Id. (citations omitted).
Furthermore, noted Judge Aldisert, Pennsylvania civil procedure rule 128(c)
mandates that Pennsylvania courts avoid constitutional questions when pos-
sible. Id. at 70. Second, according to the dissent, the majority failed to
realize that its interpretation of the Pennsylvania rules is only a prediction of
how the state courts will answer the questions presented. Id. at 70 (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting). "The court's 'tentative answer . . . may be displaced tomorrow by
a state adjudication....'" Id., citing Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (citations omitted). Third, Judge Aldisert admonished
the majority for attributing the Philadelphia rules to the entire state of Penn-
sylvania. 634 F.2d at 70 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
93. 634 F.2d at 71-72 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). While the dissent agreed
that Endicott was not controlling because it did not address a debtor's ability
to claim exemptions from process, Judge Aldisert felt that the majority failed
to give proper weight to the prejudgment/postjudgment distinction between
Endicott and Sniadach and its progeny. Id. at 72 (Aldisert, J., dissenting),
citing Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 539 F.2d at 1366. Not only were a proper
hearing and notice provided under Pennsylvania law, Judge Aldisert asserted,
but the judgment creditor's interest shifts the scales in his favor. 634 F.2d at 72
(Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert also took issue with the expansiveness
of the majority's relief, stating that "the particularized interest of the individual
in this case [in being able to exert exemptions over funds in bank accounts to
meet her daily necessities] does not justify the wholesale invalidation of other-
wise legitimate procedures used throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania." Id.
94. 634 F.2d at 80 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert admonished
that the majority's insistence that the rules specify a "prompt" or "immediate"
hearing on exemption claims "places a fetish on form that the Supreme Court
has explicitly rejected .... Id. citing Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974). Judge Aldisert noted that the Louisiana procedure under attack in
Mitchell did not utilize the word "promptly" nor did it specify a certain period
for the adjudication of the debtor's claim, yet, the Court implied an immediate
hearing. 634 F.2d at 80-81 (Aldisert, J., dissenting), citing 416 U.S. at 606. For
a discussion of Mitchell, see notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra. judge
Aldisert would opt for a similar interpretation of Pennsylvania law - one that
would "receive judicial construction consistent with the constitution." 634 F.2d
at 81 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
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and adequate postseizure notice 95 and a "prompt" 96 postseizure hearing
in which exemption claims could be asserted.97 Finally, the judge
95. 634 F.2d at 81 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert noted the gar-
nishee's duty to promptly foward a copy of the writ of attachment and its
answers to interrogatories to the debtor. Id. at 73 (Aldisert, J., dissenting),
citing PA. R. CIv. P. 3140(a), (b). Compliance with rules 3140(a) and (b) ab-
solves the garnishee of its common law duty to resist the attachment. Id. at 73
(Aldisert, J., dissenting). Therefore, the dissent concluded, the procedures are
adequate to notify the debtor of the garnishment. Id. at 74 (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting).
The dissenting opinion also took issue with the majority's holding that
failure to provide notice of only two of the numerous available exemptions
under Pennsylvania law, constituted a violation of due process. Id. at 82
(Aldisert, J., dissenting). See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8123(a), 8124, 8127(a)
(Purdon 1979). Judge Aldisert argued that the real effect of the majority's
holding was that a debtor must be notified of the existence of all available
exemptions. 634 F.2d at 82 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The judge reasoned that
there is no reason for excluding some exemptions while including others in the
notice. Id. According to the judge, the requirement that the notice also set
forth the procedures for claiming exemptions creates "a veritable Frankenstein,
a complicated procedure that far exceeds the hurt it is designed to heal and
will, in the end, prove counterproductive." Id. at 84 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
The dissenting opinion charged that such a requirement failed to comport with
"the simple notice the Supreme Court recommended in another context," Id.,
citing Memphis Light, Gas &c Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1978). For
a brief discussion of Memphis Light, see note 86 supra. Judge Aldisert con-
cuded by admonishing the majority for their failure to supply neither legislative
nor judicial precedent in requiring, as a matter of federal constitutional law,
the use of an "untested theory." 634 F.2d at 84 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). For
a discussion of the majority's stance on this issue, see notes 83-86 and accom-
panying text supra.
96. See note 94 supra.
97. 634 F.2d at 73-74 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). To support his position,
Judge Aldisert relied on H. GOODRICH 8c P. AMRAM, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA
PRACTICE: PROCEDURAL RULES SERVICE WITH FORMS (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter
cited as "GooDRICH - AMRAM"]. According to GOODRICH - AMRAM, the attach-
ment rules must be understood against the background of the foreign attach-
ment rules. 634 F.2d at 74 (Aldisert, J., dissenting), citing 4 GOODRICH -
AMRAM, supra, § 1251:1. See also 9 GOODRICH - AMRAM, supra, § 3123:1, at
278. According to the rules, exempt property is not affected by the attachment.
634 F.2d at 75 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the garnishee retains
responsibility for the exempt property. Id. See 4 GOODRICH - AMRAM, supra,
§ 1268 (a):l, at 217. Because of the garnishee's responsibility for the assertion
of exemption claims and the prompt notice of the garnishment provided to the
debtor, Judge Aldisert reasoned that a debtor can obtain a factual determina-
tion of the validity of her exemption claims before the creditor acquires the
property. 634 F.2d at 75 (Aldisert, J., dissenting), citing Zeitchick Estate v.
Zeitchick, 215 Pa. Super Ct. 106, 109, 257 A.2d 371, 373 (1969).
Judge Aldisert also took issue with the majority's analysis of rule 3123.
634 F.2d at 75-76 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the majority's
analysis of rule 3123, see note 85 supra. Foremost among judge Aldisert's criti-
cisms was the majority's assumption that the rule was not applicable to garnish-
ment of bank accounts. 634 F.2d at 75-76 (Aldisert, j., dissenting). Contrary
to the findings of the majority, the dissent noted that the sheriff did have a
role in the garnishment of intangibles such as bank accounts. Id. at 76 (Aldi-
sert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert reasoned that "[i]t is certainly not incon.
ceivable that a debtor desiring to claim an exemption could approach the
sheriff and have the garnishment order dissolved." Id. To support this prop-
39
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found that there had been no violation of the supremacy clause in
light of the fact that, under Pennsylvania law, social security funds are
exempt from attachment.
98
osition, the dissent cited two Pennsylvania cases decided prior to the promulga-
tion of the rules then in effect. Id. at 76, 79 (Aldisert, J., dissenting), citing
Bancord v. Parker, 65 Pa. 336, 337-38 (1870); Hild Floor Mach. Co. v. Rudolph,
156 Pa. Super. Ct. 102, 103, 39 A.2d 457, 458 (1944). Lacking explicit judicial
authority construing the rule, the dissent sought the guidance of the commen-
taries which suggest that rule 3123 provided a simplified procedure for the
assertion of an exemption claim. 634 F.2d at 76, 77 & n.15 (Aldisert, J., dis-
senting), citing 9 GOODRICH - AMRAM, supra, § 3123:1; commentary preceding
PA. R. Civ. P. 3101, at 316 (Purdon 1975). Furthermore, noted Judge Aldisert,
the commentaries contained no indication that the rule was not to be utilized
where the property was not held by the sheriff in preparation for a judicial
sale. 634 F.2d at 77 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The dissent agreed with the
district court that the procedure under rule 3123 was quick and simple, noting
the 48 hour deadline for judicial review of the sheriff's decision to release
property claimed to be exempt. Id. See PA. R. Civ. P. 3123(d); 9 GOODRICH -
AmRAM, supra, § 3123(d):1. See also 461 F. Supp. at 262; note 85 supra.
Finally, Judge Aldisert defended rule 3121. 634 F.2d at 77-79 (Aldisert,
J., dissenting). According to the judge, the majority confused petitions practice
with motions practice. Id. at 77 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
the majority's viewpoint on this issue, see note 85 supra. Judge Aldisert
claimed that the language of rule 3121 suggested that a court could grant im-
mediate relief to a debtor claiming an exemption upon application to the court.
634 F.2d at 77 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that while a peti-
tion "is in the nature of a complaint or a declaration", a motion is an ex-
tremely informal procedure that need not be in writing. Id. at 79 (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, noted the dissent, motion or application procedures
are more expeditious than petition practice. Id.
98. 634 F.2d at 81 (Aldisert, J., dissenting), citing Mellon Nat'l Bank & Tr.
Co. v. Cole, 118 Pitts. L.J. 298 (Allegheny Cty. C.P. 1970). The judge deferred
to the district court's disposition of the supremacy clause issue. 634 F.2d at 82
(Aldisert, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the majority's disposition of this
issue, see notes 87-91 and accompanying text supra. See 461 F. Supp. at 257-58.
Also dissenting, Judge Weis essentially concurred with Judge Aldisert; he was
especially troubled by the majority's notice requirement. 634 F.2d at 93-94
(Weis, J., dissenting).
Subsequent to the Finberg decision the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
amended Rules 3108, 3123(d), 3142(a), 3252 and adopted Rule 3123:1. See
note 85 supra.
Rule 3108 was amended to provide a dual form of notice to the judgment
debtor. Under new Rule 3108(d), the writ of execution containing the
requisite notice under amended Rule 3252 will be mailed to the debtor by the
sheriff. In addition, present Rule 3141 requires notice from the garnishee if
the garnishee is to avoid any duty to resist the attachment or defend the action.
See Explanatory note following Rule 3108.
Rule 3123.1 was promulgated in order to provide the judgment debtor with
the opportunity to claim exemption or immunity of property and to demand
the prompt hearing guaranteed by the Finberg case. Under Rule 3123.1, it is
the sheriff's duty to notify the plaintiff, the garnishee and the court of the filing
of the exemption claim. Subsection (b) of Rule 3123.1 mandates that the court
shall hear the claim within five business days after the filing of the claim and
shall promptly dispose of the matter.
Rule 3252 was amended to include, as part of the form of the writ of
execution, notice of the available major exemptions, a "Claim of Exemption"
form to be executed by the judgment debtor and filed with the sheriff,
and notice of where to obtain legal advice. See Explanatory note following
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Reviewing the court's decision, it is submitted that, while for the
most part their conclusions were justified, the court's analysis and rea-
.soning were cursory.99 It is suggested that central to the analysis of the
due process requirements in the postjudgment context is the continuing
validity and applicability of the Endicott rationale, since Endicott
denied stringent due process protections prior to postjudgment seizure. 100
Although the Finberg majority properly discounted the applicability
of Endicott in this action,101 it is submitted that, in adopting the ra-
tionale of Sniadach and its progeny for prejudgment attachments, 0 2
the court failed to elaborate upon various factors which tend to diminish
the continuing validity of the Endicott theory of constructive notice in
the context of postjudgment attachments, 03 especially as applied to the
Rule 3108, Forms following Rule 3252(a). For a further analysis of the new
rules, see Explanatory note following Rule 3108.
After the promulgation of the new rules, the defendants petitioned the
Third Circuit to vacate its judgment on the ground that, as a result of the new
rules, the case was now moot and that further proceedings in the district court,
as required by the Third Circuit's mandate, were unnecessary. Finberg v. Sulli-
van, No. 79-1129, slip op. at 3 (3d. Cir., May 11, 1981) (en banc) (denial of
defendant's Motion for Vacation of Judgment). In refusing to vacate the
judgment, the Third Circuit, through Judge Adams, found that the case was
not moot since Finberg was still entitled to a hearing in the district court on
the issue of class certification as well as a review of whether the new rules in
their operation satisfied the test enunciated in the court's earlier opinion. Id.
:slip op. at 9-11.
Judge Weis dissented, arguing that the case was mooted by the enactment
of the new rules. Id. slip op. at 15-19 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert did
not participate in the consideration of the decision. Id. slip op. at 1.
99. See notes 103-07, 117-19 & 123-25 and accompanying text infra.
100. For a discussion of Endicott, see notes 35-38 and accompanying text
,supra. For the majority's views on Endicott, see notes 67-69 and accompanying
text supra. For the dissenting viewpoint of judge Aldisert, see note 93 and
.accompanying text supra.
101. It is submitted that Endicott was properly distinguished on the ground
that Finberg involved the existence of a statutory exemption from garnishment.
The validity of a defense such as an exemption claim is one that is not con-
-sidered during the action on the indebtedness. Therefore, it is submitted, the
-debtor should be protected from erroneous attachment of property which is
exempted from seizure. For a discussion of the majority's rationale on this
issue, see notes 69-75 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of addi-
tional factors tending to diminish the continuing validity of Endicott, see notes
103-07 and accompanying text infra.
102. 634 F.2d at 57-58. For the citations to Sniadach and its progeny, see
note 19 supra. It is suggested that Chief Judge Seitz' finding that the pre-
judgment cases were controlling, was correct. See notes 70-75 and accompany-
ing text supra. See also Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 539 F.2d at 1363-68;
note 52 and accompanying text supra; Finberg v. Sullivan, 461 F. Supp. at
258-59;; Betts v. Tom, 431 F. Supp. at 1374-76, note 63 and accompanying text
supra. See generally Alderman, supra note 16; Countryman, The Bill of Rights
and The Bill Collector, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 521, 543-45 (1973); Greenfield, supra
note 19.
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present case 104 which involved the question of whether a judgment
debtor should be granted adequate procedures to guard against the
wrongful deprivation of exempted property.105 It should be noted that
the issue of exempt property did not arise in Endicott.106 Further-
104. It is submitted that the decision in Griffin is one such factor. For a
discussion of Griffin, see notes 39-43 and accompanying text supra. As the
majority opinion in Griffin made no reference to Endicott, it is submitted that
the Griffin Court ignored the apparent inconsistency between the two cases.
While both cases involved the question of postjudgment/preseizure notice and
hearing, the Endicott and Griffin cases reached opposite results. See Dunham,
supra note 19, at 82; notes 35-43 and accompanying text supra.
While the Court in Hanner v. De Marcus, 390 U.S. 736 (1968) (dismissal of
certiorari), declined to consider whether Endicott should be overruled, the dis-
sent to the dismissal of certiorari, it is submitted, gives us some indication of
which direction the Court is likely to go. See note 44 and accompanying text
supra. Three dissenters concluded that Griffin effectively rejected Endicott and
its contructive notice theory, 390 U.S. at 741-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting from
dismissal of certiorari). Furthermore, they noted that the Endicott rationale
had been diluted by the court's new approach to due process. Id at 741
(Douglas, J., dissenting from dismissal of cartiorari).
The Court in Moya v. De Baca also refused to consider the continued
vitality of Endicott. See note 44 and accompanying text supra. However, com-
mentators believe that the decision in Moya was based on the insubstantiality
of the federal question presented and that the Court is merely waiting for a
"better" case before considering whether to overrule Endicott. See Kennedy,
supra note 44, at 175 n.67; Levy, Attachment, Garnishment and Garnishment
Execution: Some American Problems Considered in Light of the English Ex-
perience, 5 CONN. L. REv. 399, 435 & n.185 (1972-73). In this regard it should
be noted that "the plaintiffs (in Moya] had actual notice of the garnishment,
were represented by counsel, and made no attempt to claim their exemptions."
Levy, supra, at 435 n.184, citing Moya v. De Baca, 286 F. Supp. 606, 608 (D.N.M.
1968) (three judge court) (emphasis added), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 825
(1969) (per curiam). It should also be noted that summary decisions are gen-
erally considered to be of doubtful precedential value. See Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974).
It is submitted that an additional factor may be the new approach that
the court has taken to the requirements of due process. It is suggested that
in addition to the cases cited by Justice Douglas in his Hanner dissent, Sniadach
and its progeny provide a suitable framework for a postjudgment due process
analysis. See 390 U.S. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting from dismissal of cer-
tiorari); note 44 supra. It should be noted also that Justices Harlan and
Brennan would have remanded Moya for further consideration in light of
Sniadach. 395 U.S. at 825 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the decisions
not to hear Hanner and Moya came before the Mitchell ruling upholding pre-
judgment/postseizure procedures. For a discussion of Mitchell, see notes 25-29
and accompanying text supra. While many think it is unlikely that the Court
would require postjudgment/preseizure hearing, it is felt that at a minimum
due process requires adequate postseizure process. See Brown v. Liberty Loan
Corp., 539 F.2d at 1368-69; Betts v. Tom, 431 F. Supp. at 1377-78; First Nat'l
Bank v. Hasty, 410 F. Supp. 482, 490-91 (E.D. Mich. 1976). See also Alderman,
supra note 16, at 17; Dunham, supra note 19, at 94. See generally, notes 47-49
and accompanying text supra.
105. For a further discussion of this issue, see note 101 supra; notes 106-07
and accompanying text infra.
106. See 266 U.S. at 285. The New York statute considered in Endicott
authorized the garnishment of only 10% of a debtor's wages, and the judgment
creditor only claimed this amount, consequently not more than 10% of the
[VOL. 26: p. 579
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more, it is submitted that, as three Supreme Court Justices have rec-
ognized, a judgment debtor should be granted due process protections
to enable him to assert those defenses which would prevent the seizure
of his property.
107
Having properly discounted the applicability of Endicott,108 it is
suggested that the court was correct in applying the rationale of the
Supreme Court's more recent due process cases concerning debtor-
creditor relationships. 100 Notwithstanding the dissent's charges,110 it
is submitted that the court placed proper weight on the fact that, un-
like Sniadach and its progeny, the present case concerned postjudgment
due process.' Judge Aldisert quoted the Brown court's finding that
the judgment creditor's interest should prevail in his argument that the
majority failed to take into account the pre/postjudgment distinction
between the Finberg case and cases such as Sniadach.1" 2 However, it
is submitted that Judge Aldisert himself failed to recognize an im-
portant distinguishing factor between Brown and Finberg. While the
question in Brown was whether due process required preseizure pro-
cedure, the Finberg court focussed solely on postseizure due process
requirements.1 3 It is submitted that the court's balancing of interest
approach,114 allowing the debtor to prevail in the postjudgment/post-
debtor's wages were garnished. 266 U.S. at 286; Greenfield, supra note 19, at
888-89, 898. Therefore, as at least one commentator has suggested, Endicott
perhaps may be inadequate authority where a judgment debtor has been de-
prived of arguably exempt property. Greenfield, supra note 19, at 889.
107. As Justice Douglas queried in his dissent to the dismissal of certiorari
in Hanner v. DeMarcus: "Is there any more reason to accept in this case the
Endicott fiction of constructive notice because of knowledge of the underlying
judgment than there was in Griffin?" 390 U.S. 736, 742 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of certiorari). It is submitted that, as justice Douglas
suggested, a judgment debtor should be permitted to assert those'defenses which
would prevent the seizure of some, if not all of his property. It is suggested
that this argument is especially forceful here where an exemption from execu-
tion, unrelated to those defenses asserted to the merits of the case which deter-
mined the amount of the debt, is being asserted. See Dunham, supra note 19, at
83-84; Greenfield, supra note 19, at 897-98.
108. See notes 101-07 and accompanying text supra.
109. See notes 70-75 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
these cases, see notes 19-34 and accompanying text supra.
110. 634 F.2d at 71-72 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). See note 93 and accom-
panying text supra.
111. For a discussion of the majority's reasoning in applying the Sniadach
line of cases, see notes 71-75 and accompanying text supra.
112. 634 F.2d at 72 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). For a discussion ot Brown,
see notes 50-54 and accompanying text supra.
113. See 634 F.2d at 59; Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 539 F.2d at 1357;
note 80 and accompanying text supra.
114. The balancing-of-interests test in the due process context is derived
from Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), and Matthews v. Eldridge,
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seizure context, reached an equitable accommodation of the competing
interests."15 While it is conceded that the scales tip in favor of the
creditor when preseizure procedures are requested, the debtor's inter-
ests should prevail in the postseizure context; the seizure of the property
prevents the debtor from destroying, concealing, or disposing of the
property while adequate notice of exemption claims and a prompt
postseizure hearing will ensure against the wrongful deprivation of
debtor's property which may be subject to a valid exemption claim.1 06
However, it is contended that in reaching its balancing of interests the
court failed to analyze all of the interests involved.117 Most importantly,
the court failed to note that creditors as well as debtors have an inter-
est in the prompt determination of the validity of exemption claims."18
It is submitted that the creditor has an interest in seizing only those.
items which are properly subject to seizure; if exempt property is taken.
from the debtor, the additional delay before the writ of garnishment
is quashed and the creditor can start the garnishment process on the
debtor's other property will cause further delays and expenses, thereby'
diminishing the creditor's ultimate recovery."19
panying text supra. For the text of a statement of the test by the Matthews
ourt, see note 76 supra.
115. For a discussion of the factors used in balancing the respective interests
of debtor and creditor, see notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra.
116. The Finberg majority noted that the notice and an opportunity to be
heard before attachment are not absolutely necessary. 634 F.2d at 58. How-
ever, the procedures must afford the debtor adequate safeguards against erro-
neous or arbitrary seizures. Id. It is submitted that this statement reflects a
proper application of the Mitchell "adequate procedural safeguard" rationale
from the prejudgment/postseizure to the postjudgment/postseizure context. It
should be noted that even in Brown and Ratgoza which upheld postjudgment
garnishment statutes, the courts found that there were adequate postseizure
safeguards. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 49-60 and accompanying
text supra.
117. It is suggested that the creditor has additional interests which the
majority failed to discuss. See Betts v. Tom, 431 F. Supp. at 1376. The creditor
has an interest in prompt enforcement of his judgment; not only do amounts
expended to recover the judgment diminish the creditor's ultimate recovery, but
any significant delay will, in time of inflation, lead to further loss. Id. at 1375.
It is submitted that the creditor also has an interest in execution of the judg-
ment before the debtor, having already lost in court, can dispose of his assets.
Id. at 1375-76. It is suggested that the state's interests are neutral. Id. The
existence of the exemption clearly shows that the state has an interest in ensuring
that exempt funds are not garnished. Id. at 1376. Likewise, it is submitted, the
state favors prompt satisfaction of judicially validated claims in order to facilitate
commercial transactions. See Greenfield, supra note 19, at 910-15. For a dis-
cussion of an additional factor which the majority failed to consider, see text
accompanying note 119 infra. For a discussion of the factors which were used
by the Finberg court in balancing the interests of the debtor and creditor, see
notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra.
118. See Betts v. Tom, 431 F. Supp. at 1375.
119. See id.; Greenfield, supra note 19, at 910-15.
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While the Pennsylvania procedures may have been designed to
provide for a prompt postseizure hearing,120 it is further submitted
that the present case demonstrated how poorly the rules failed in their
operation and effect due to the length of time required to release the
exempted funds from attachment.12 ' It is contended that a five-month
120. See 634 F.2d at 72-79 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); notes 96-97 and accom-
panying text supra. While Judge Aldisert was thorough in his analysis of
Pennsylvania's then applicable procedural rules, it is submitted that he has
overlooked a number of important factors. It should be noted that the judge
was correct in his recognition that a debtor could obtain a factual determination
of the validity of his or her exemption claims before the creditor acquired the
property. However, it is contended, Judge Aldisert failed to realize that the
issue here was not who was holding the garnished funds but for how long the
debtor was deprived of the funds before the validity of the debtor's exemption
claims could be determined.
It is submitted that Judge Aldisert's disposition of rule 3123 was essentially
correct; while on the surface the rule seemed not to apply to the garnishment of
assets such as bank accounts, the commentators are especially convincing in dis-
crediting the majority's viewpoint on the issue. See 9 GOODRICH - AMRAM, supra
note 97, § 3123, at 276-84. For a discussion of the majority's viewpoint, see note
85 supra. Nonetheless, it is submitted that Judge Aldisert overlooked an im-
portant factor. Rule 3123(d) provided for a 48 hour period in which the debtor
could seek review of the sheriff's appraisal or designation of property. PA. R.
Civ. P. 3123(d). Contrary to the dissent's belief, it is contended that this rule
does not provide for an actual hearing within such time. In the case sub judice
for example, it took some 20 days to determine Finberg's entitlement to the
general Pennsylvania exemption after the court was petitioned. See note 7
supra.
It is contended that, as Judge Aldisert charged, the majority placed undue
importance on the absence of the word "prompt," at least in the specification
of a certain period in which the exemption claim must be adjudicated. See
note 94 supra. However, it is contended that the position of the majority was
hardened by the failure of the rules, despite their intended flexibility and
simplicity. On the issue of "prompt" procedures, it is also interesting to note
the statute upheld in Raigoza. For a discussion of Raigoza, see notes 55-60
and accompanying text supra. The California court in Raigoza was adamantly
opposed to the application of the Sniadach line of cases to the postjudgment
context. Raigoza v. Sperl, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 564, 567, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 298-
99, 301. However, the statute under attack in Raigoza provided a defined
period in which exemption claims had to be adjudicated. Id. The statute in
Raigoza required the debtor to file a claim of exemption within ten days of
the date of levy. Id. at 564, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 298-99. Furthermore, the
debtor's notice informed him of the existence of possible exemptions. Id. at
562, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 298. For a discussion of the probable scope of notice
required by the Finberg court, see notes 123-25 and accompanying text infra.
The creditor in Raigoza had five days to oppose the claim of exemption or
else the property would be released. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 564, 110 Cal. Rptr. at
299. Subsequently, one party must seek a hearing within five days of the
creditor's counteraffidavit; a hearing must be scheduled within 15 days of the
motion. Id. Thus, on an unopposed claim of exemption, the debtor's depriva-
tion of property lasts approximately two weeks; on a contested claim the debtor
will be deprived for about five weeks. Id. It is suggested that procedures
such as California's, rather than the confusing Pennsylvania rules, are better
designed to provide guaranteed "adequate procedural safeguards" for debtors
and creditors alike. For a discussion of other favorable provisions under the
statute analyzed in Raigoza, see note 125 infra.
121. See note 7 supra. It should be noted that it took the common pleas
court 20 days to determine that Finberg was entitled to the $300 general
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delay in establishing the validity of a claimed exemption fails to pro-
vide "due process of law"; 122 surely such a delay cannot rationally be
deemed "prompt". Additionally, the dissent may have been correct
in concluding that the scope of the majority's notice requirement estab-
lishes an unwieldy burden by requiring notice of the numerous pro-
cedures which may be employed in the claiming of a statutory exemp-
tion.12 3  The majority's requirement of notice of the procedures
required to claim an exemption, it is submitted, would clearly be too
burdensome, especially here where there is already much confusion as
to what procedures may be utilized and how those procedures operate.
124
Furthermore, as there are numerous exemptions under Pennsylvania
law, it is submitted that the majority's requirement of notice of two
specific exemptions would eventually lead to the requirement of notice
of all exemptions. 125 It is nonetheless contended that the notice pro-
exemption under Pennsylvania law. 634 F.2d at 52. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 8123(a) (Purdon 1979). Furthermore, it took four months for Sterling
to take Finberg's deposition. 634 F.2d at 52. While Sterling immediately
agreed to release the remaining funds, it took another two weeks to get a
court order to that effect, and over a month longer before the funds were finally
released by the garnishee. Id. It is submitted that, contrary to .judge Aldi-
sert's beliefs, such delay in the determination of an exemption claim is far
from prompt.
122. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
123. For a discussion of judge Aldisert's analysis, see notes 95-97 and
accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court has long required "notice rea-
sonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and to afford them an opportunity to present
their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314 (1950). The Court reiterated this principle in Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965). For the relevant language, see note 14 supra. For a brief
discussion of the Supreme Court's recent expansion of the scope of the notice
requirement, see note 44 supra.
It is submitted that the scope of the majority's requirement may have gone
beyond what the Supreme Court had in mind in Memphis Light, Gas Se Water
Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978). For a discussion of Memphis Light, see note
86 supra.
124. For a discussion of the diverging views of the majority and dissenting
opinions, see notes 83-86 & 94-97 and accompanying text supra.
125. See 634 F.2d at 82 n.26 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8123, 8124, 8127 (Purdon 1979). It is suggested that, as Judge Aldi-
sert noted in his dissent, this requirement might prove too burdensome to both
the creditor and the state. See 634 F.2d at 83-84 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); note
95 supra. However, it is suggested, the majority's requirement could be satis-
fied through a more limited notice of the existence of the various statutory
exemptions. For instance, the California procedures under attack in Raigoza
v. Sperl specified that the writ of execution
must be in a specified form, which includes a notice to the judgment
debtor that he "may be entitled to file a claim exempting [his] prop-
erty from execution." The form states that the claim must be filed
"within ten days from the date [the] property was levied upon" and
advises the debtor that if he wished to consult an attorney, he should
do so promptly so that an affidavit, if any, may be filed on time.
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vided to plaintiff Finberg was inadequate as it was not "reasonably
calculated" to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to claim her statutory
exemptions.1
6
Furthermore, because the analysis of both the due process and
supremacy clause issues entailed an analysis of the effect and operation
of Pennsylvania's postjudgment garnishment procedures, 127 it is sub-
mitted that the majority's analysis of the supremacy clause issue prop-
erly followed from the treatment accorded to the due process issues.
28
It is submitted, moreover, that in light of such analysis, the Pennsyl-
vania rules were correctly held to be violative of the supremacy
clause. 12 9 Despite the Pennsylvania courts' recognition of the social
security exemption, 3 0 "the net effect of Pennsylvania's postjudgment
garnishment procedures is to . . . [frustrate the] 'purposes and objec-
tives of Congress' " in its enactment of the social security benefit
exemption.18 1
34 Cal. App. 3d at 562, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 298 (citation omitted). It is sub-
mitted that such a requirement would provide a workable accommodation be-
tween the majority and dissenting opinions. For a discussion of other favor-
able provisions under the California statute analyzed in Raigoza, see note 120
supra.
126. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 314 (1950).
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's recent expansion of the requirement of
the adequacy of notice, see note 44 supra. See also notes 84-86 and accom-
panying text supra.
127. For a further discussion of the majority's analysis in Finberg, see
notes 79-91 and accompanying text supra.
128. The majority's due process analysis focused on the operation or effect
of Pennsylvania's postjudgment garnishment procedures. 634 F.2d at 59-62.
See notes 80-86 and accompanying text supra. Chief Judge Seitz' supremacy
clause analysis stemmed from the approach taken in Perez v. Campbell, 402
U.S. 637 (1971), where the Supreme Court analyzed the purposes of the federal
statute, as well as the effect of the state statute. See 634 F.2d at 63; notes 90-91
and accompanying text supra.
129. See note 128 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that the
purpose of the Pennsylvania garnishment statute does not conflict with the
social security exemption. See Finberg v. Sullivan, 461 F. Supp. at 258. How-
ever, whether or not the exemption has been recognized by the Pennsylvania
courts, the garnishment statute in its effect conflicted with the Social Security
Act exemption, 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976). It is suggested that under due process
analysis, a debtor under Pennsylvania law receives inadequate notice and hear-
ing after his property has been attached, thereby thwarting the purpose of the
federal exemption in its effect. In the present case, for example, Finberg was
deprived of her social security benefits which were garnished in her bank
account for a period of over five months. 634 F.2d at 52. See note 7 supra.
130. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Cole, 118 Pitt. L.J. 298 (Allegheny
Cty. C.P. 1970). It is submitted that contrary to Judge Aldisert's findings, the
majority's analysis was straightforward. See 634 F.2d at 81-82 (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting). After noting that the effect of Pennsylvania's procedures frustrated
the purpose of exempting social security benefits from execution, the court
simply noted that Pennsylvania's mere recognition of the exemption did not
alleviate the frustration of that purpose. 634 F.2d at 63.
131. 634 F.2d at 63 (emphasis added), quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
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The Third Circuit's opinion in Finberg, it is submitted, has already
had a far reaching impact on debtor-creditor relationships in Pennsyl-
vania.'3 2 The Finberg decision has resulted in revisions to the Penn-
sylvania postjudgment garnishment rules concerning the resolution of
statutory exemption claims. 13 3 At a minimum, the decision will be
limited to its narrow holding. However, it is contended that the
majority's attempt to limit its notice requirement to the general $300
exemption and the social security exemption, only two of the numerous
possible exemptions, will be fruitless.' 34 The holding is, as the dissent
has charged, likely to be expanded to provide notice of all exemptions
and the procedures for claiming them. 135  Furthermore, whereas a
creditor's interests are protected by allowing the judgment debtor's
property to be attached, the prompt hearing guaranteed by this deci-
sion will ensure that the judgment debtor's use and enjoyment of his
property, needed for subsistence living, will be restored without undue
delay. 1 6 The broader implication of the case may be felt sooner than
expected as the district court applies the Finberg rationale to the newly
enacted rules on remand.'
3 7
However, as Judge Aldisert argued in his dissent, the court's ap-
proach to the Pennsylvania postjudgment garnishment procedures may
132. As judge Weis noted in his dissent from the denial of defendants'
Motion for Vacation of Judgment, "the majority decision . . . caused substan-
tial disruption to long established commercial practices in [Pennsylvania]."
Finberg v. Sullivan, No. 79-1129, slip op. at 19 (3d Cir. May 11, 1981) (en banc)
(Weis, J., dissenting).
133. Subsequent to the Finberg decision, the rules were revised. For a
further discussion of this development, see notes 85 & 98 supra. It is sub-
mitted that this result is far more comprehensible and desirable than the
former hodgepodge of procedural rules arguably applicable to the claiming
of statutory exemptions. See notes 81-86, 94-97 & 120-26 and accompanying text
supra.
134. See notes 86, 95 & 124-26 and accompanying text supra.
135. See notes 95 & 125 and accompanying text supra. The Pennsylvania
Civil Procedural Rules Committee recognized this in drafting the revisions.
See Explanatory Note following Rule 3108.
136. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
137. In this respect it is interesting to note the broad reading given to the
original Finberg case by judge Adams in his opinion denying the defendant's
Motion for Vacation of judgment. Finberg v. Sullivan, No. 79-1129 (3d Cir.,
May 11, 1981) (en banc). In discussing the issue of class certification upon
remand to the district court, Judge Adams noted that:
For example, if the district court certifies the class of all judgment
debtors who have either legal or equitable defenses to garnishment
of their personal property, it would have to consider whether the
amended rules provide adequate hearings for debtors' assertion of
all defenses. On their face, the new rules appear to provide a prompt
hearing only for debtors with exemption claims. Moreover, because
our opinion of October 27, 1980, addressed the hearing requirement
in the context of Mrs. Finberg's claim that her Social Security bene-
[VOL. 26: p. 579
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be rendered meaningless by a subsequent interpretation by the Penn-
sylvania courts, since the Third Circuit's resolution is merely "tenta-
tive [and] may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication." 138
However, putting aside such hypothetical questions, it is submitted that
the Finberg decision was correct. For although the Third Circuit's
opinion may create some undesirable results, such as unwieldy notice
requirements and probable expansion in the number of exemptions of
which a debtor must be given notice,139 it is nonetheless submitted that
the case will have the effect of "minimiz[ing] substantively unfair or
mistaken deprivation[s] of property . . . without due process of law
reflect[ing] the high value, embedded in our constitutional and political
fits were exempt from garnishment, the opinion will likely prove only
limited guidance for the district court's resolution of the rights of
other class members.
Id. slip op. at 9 n.ll (emphasis added).
It is submitted that if the tenor of Judge Adams' comments bear fruition
in the district court, the Third Circuit's mandate in the original Finberg
decision will have a far greater implication than the Pennsylvania Civil Pro-
cedural Rules Committee, or for that matter the Pennsylvania legal community,
had anticipated.
138. 634 F.2d at 70 (Aldisert, J., dissenting), quoting Railroad Comm'n
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). See note 92 supra. In addition,
three factors create concern over whether the Supreme Court might hear on
appeal a case such as Finberg even though the case creates a split among the
circuits. Initially, however, it should be noted that the Finberg court reaches
a result opposite to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp.
For a discussion of Brown, see notes 50-54 and accompanying text supra.
However, the court in Finberg conceded, as the court in Brown had previ-
ously held, that due process did not guarantee postjudgment/preseizure pro-
cedures. 634 F.2d at 58; Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 539 F.2d at 1368. The
courts differed only in their interpretation of whether the state procedures in
question had provided adequate procedural safeguards after seizure had taken
place. Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d at 61-62; Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp.,
539 F.2d at 1368.
The first factor mitigating against a grant of certiorari is that as noted
previously, the Court has been reluctant to decide similar cases. For a dis-
cussion of these cases, see notes 44 & 104 and accompanying text supra.
Second, one of the central issues in Finberg centered around an apparent
confusion as to which Pennsylvania rules were applicable and how the rules
should be interpreted; the Court may simply await a "better" case. See notes
81-86, 94-97 & 120-26 and accompanying text supra. Third, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has declined to employ the Endicott construction notice
rationale in Luskey v. Steffron, Inc., 461 Pa. 305, 336 A.2d 298 (1975),
aff'd on rehearing, 469 Pa. 377, 366 A.2d 223 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
968 (1977) (court held unconstitutional Pennsylvania's procedures for the
sale of real property in satisfaction of judgments; the law which permitted
notice by publication in local newspapers and by the posting of handbills on
the property failed to provide adequate notice even though there was no
statutory exemption for real property). See note 48 supra; Greenfield, supra
note 19, at 890. However, such a decision is largely academic as the defend-
ants have abandoned their opportunity to seek Supreme Court review; the
time period for the docketing of an appeal to the Court has expired. See-
Finberg v. Sullivan, No. 79-1129, slip op. at I n.1 (3d Cir. May 11, 1981>
(en banc).
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history, that we place on a person's right to enjoy what is his, free of
government interference." 140
Lawrence S. Chane
140. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 81 (citations omitted). It is submitted
that, although Fuentes concerned prejudgment due process questions, all due
process questions in the debtor-creditor area should be guided by this principle.
For a discussion of the applicability of prejudgment cases such as Fuentes in
the postjudgment context, see notes 70-75, 93 Sc 102 and accompanying text
supra. For a general discussion of Fuentes, see notes 23-24 and accompanying
text supra.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STANDING - CITIZEN INTEREST IN THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE HELD SUFFICIENT TO GIVE STANDING TO
CHALLENGE AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THAT CLAUSE.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (1980)
Pursuant to the Federal Property and Administrative Act of 1949
(Act),' the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) con-
veyed 77 acres of surplus government property, including buildings,
fixtures, and equipment situated thereon, to Valley Forge .Christian
College (College), a sectarian institution. 2 Under the Act, the Secretary
of HEW is required to grant discounts to transferees for any benefit
accruing to the United States from the designated use of the transferred
property.8 In exchange for the College's agreement to use the conveyed
property for educational purposes for thirty years, it was granted a 100%
discount, thereby receiving the property for no monetary consideration. 4
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. (Americans
United), on behalf of its members, and four of its directors, in their
1. 40 U.S.C. §484(k)(1)(A) (1976). The pertinent portion of the Act
provides:
Subject to the disapproval of the Administrator [of General
Services] ... the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, through
such officers or employees of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare as he may designate, may sell or lease such real property,
including buildings, fixtures, and equipment situated thereon, for
educational purposes to the states and their political subdivisions and
instrumentalities, and tax-supported educational institutions, and to
other non-profit educational institutions which have been held exempt
from taxation under section 101(6) of title 26.
Td.
2. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. v. United
States Dep't. of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 619 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. gran'ted, 101 S. Ct. 1345 (1981). "[T]he college's primary purpose is to
train leaders for church-related activities. Its curriculum is devoted to bible
study, christian service, and theology." 619 F.2d at 253-54.
When Congress created the Department of Education in 1979, HEW was
renamed the Department of Health and Human Services. See 5 U.S.C. § 101
(1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 692 (1979). For purposes
of this note, the agency will be referred to by its original designation.
3. 40 U.S.C. § 484(k)(1)(C) (1976). This section provides:
In fixing the sale or lease value of property to be disposed of
under subparagraph (A) . . . the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare shall take into consideration any benefit which has accrued
or may accrue to the United States from the use of such property by
any such state, political subdivision, instrumentality or institution.
Id. This allowance is further delineated in the Code of Federal Regulations.
See 45 C.F.R. § 12.9(a) (1979).
4. 619 F.2d at 253. The total value of the property transferred to the
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individual capacities, challenged HEW's transfer to a sectarian organi-
zation as violative of their individual rights as secured by the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment.5 Plaintiffs brought suit against
HEW in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania 6 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to void the
transfer of property, alleging "injury in fact" to its members through
HEW's violation of their constitutional right to separation of church
and state.7 Americans United alleged that it was qualified to represent
the interests of its members because its express purpose is "to defend,
maintain and promote religious liberty and the constitutional principles
of separation of church and state." 8
The district court dismissed the suit,9 holding that all plaintiffs
lacked standing as taxpayers to challenge the allegedly invalid property
transfer. 10 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit" reversed and remanded,' 2 holding that although plaintiffs
lacked standing as taxpayers,' 3 their interests as citizens in the establish-
5. Id. at 254. The relevant portion of the first amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.....
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
The Supreme Court has been divided concerning what government acts
violate the establishment clause. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works,
426 U.S. 736 (1976) (5-4 decision upholding state grants to private colleges,
including religiously affiliated institutions, subject to restriction that money
not be used for sectarian purposes); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
(5-4 decision upholding federal construction grants to colleges and universities
for buildings and facilities used exclusively for secular educational purposes,
including church-related institutions); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947) (5-4 decision upholding reimbursement to parents for bus transportation
of children to and from schools, including Catholic parochial schools).
6. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. v. United
States Dept, of Health, Educ. and Welfare, No. 77-1321 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15,
1978), rev'd, 619 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1345 (1981).
7. 619 F.2d at 261.
8. 619 F.2d at 254. This purpose is expressed in Americans United's
articles of incorporation. Id. Americans United is a non-profit tax-exempt
organization claiming a membership of approximately 90,000. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The district court found that the only basis advanced by the
individual plaintiffs and Americans United in support of their claim to stand-
ing was taxpayer status. Id. For a discussion of taxpayer status as a basis
for standing, see notes 51-56 and accompanying text infra.
11. The case was heard by Judges Adams, Rosenn, and Weis. judge
Adams delivered the opinion of the court and Judge Rosenn wrote a concur-
ring opinion. A dissenting opinion was filed by Judge Weis.
12. 619 F.2d at 266. The case was remanded for proceedings on the
merits of the case. Id.
13. Id. at 254. The district court read the plaintiffs' pleadings as as-
serting only taxpayer standing. See note 10 supra. The Court of Appeals,
however, saw the thrust of the plaintiffs' argument as asserting that they were
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ment clause provided them with a sufficient personal stake in the contro-
versy to vest them with standing to challenge an alleged violation of
the clause. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.
v. United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 619
F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1345 (1981).
The judicial concept that a litigant must have standing to sue
emanates from Article III of the Constitution which limits the juris-
diction of the federal courts to "cases and controversies." 14 The re-
quirement of standing, as a prerequisite to the court's exercise of
jurisdiction, embodies both constitutional and jurisprudential aspects 15
in the principle that the individual seeking judicial resolution of a
controversy must be a proper party to bring the suit.16
The law of standing has been construed to require that a plaintiff
allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that degree of concrete adverseness which sharpens the presenta-
tion of issues." 17 Adverseness is necessary because the court depends
on the parties' representations and arguments in resolving the legal
issues.' 8 While the test for standing originally required the plaintiff
to allege that the challenged government action infringed on a "legally
entitled to seek relief as citizens protected by the establishment clause. 619
F.2d at 254. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding that plaintiff
lacked taxpayer standing, see note 58 and accompanying text infra.
14. U.S. CONsT. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This clause provides:
(1) The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; -
to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls; - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; - to Con-
troversies to which the United States shall be a Party; - to Contro-
versies between two or more States; - between a State and Citizens
of another State; - between Citizens of different States; - between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
15. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500 (1975). Both the constitu-
tional and jurisprudential considerations encompassed by the concept of
standing revolve around a concern about the proper role of the court. Id.
at 498.
16. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968). The Flast Court indi-
cated that a proper party is necessary so that the federal courts will avoid
deciding ill-defined constitutional issues. See id. at 100. For a discussion of
the issue of who is a proper party to bring a suit, see notes 17-56 and accom-
panying text infra.
17. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1961) (Supreme Court upheld Tennes-
see residents' standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute appor-
tioning the members of Tennessee's general assembly among its counties, on
the ground that the plaintiffs were seeking to protect an interest of their own,
in asserting a violation of their fourteenth amendment right to equal pro-
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protected interest",' 9 modern developments have lowered the standing
barrier.
20
As first set forth in Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp 21
and Barlow v. Collins,22 current standing law requires that the plaintiff
suffer "injury in fact" 25 to an interest which is "arguably within the
-zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the federal statute or
constitutional guarantee in question." 24 While Data Processing and
19. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940) (standing
denied to plaintiffs, government suppliers who were challenging an act which
required that government suppliers agree to pay their employees the minimum
wage, on the grounds that no legal rights of plaintiffs were invaded as the
government may purchase from whomever it chooses); Tennessee Elec. Power
Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118 (1939) (standing denied to
plaintiffs, corporations which generate and distribute electricity who were seek-
ing to restrain the Tennessee Valley Authority from generating and selling
electricity, on the grounds that no legal right of plaintiffs was violated as
plaintiffs were not legally entitled to be free from competition); Alabama
Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938) (Standing denied to plaintiff, manu-
facturer and supplier of energy in Alabama who was contesting government
loans to municipalities for the construction of light and power plants and
claiming loss of business, on the grounds that plaintiff was not legally entitled
to be free from competition).
As explained by Justice Frankfurter, the "legal interest" test requires that
the plaintiff, in order to assert standing, must establish that the contested
conduct was a wrong which harmed a legally protected interest of the plain-
tiff. Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring), citing Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. at 479;
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1936). As noted by
Justice Frankfurter, this definition contains terms of art which may only be
given meaning through an examination of the cases in which this test was
applied. 341 U.S. at 152 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
20. See notes 21-27 and accompanying text infra.
21. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The plaintiffs in Data Processing, sellers of data
processing services, challenged a ruling which allowed banks to make data
processing services available to their customers and other banks, alleging that
this competition would cause them a loss in profits. Id. at 151-52. The Court
upheld standing, finding that the lost profit was sufficient injury in fact and
that the plaintiffs' interests were arguably within the zone of interests pro-
tected by the applicable law. Id. at 151-56.
22. 397 U.S. 159 (1970). This case was decided on the same day as Data
Processing. Id. at 159. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, as he did in
Data Processing, upheld standing under the Data Processing test. Id. at
163-67.
23. Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. at 152. In establishing
the "injury in fact" test, Justice Douglas rejected the "legal interest" test as
going to the merits of the case. Id. at 153. For a discussion of the legal in-
terest test, see note 19 supra.
24. 397 U.S. at 153. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice White, while con-
curring in the result, wrote a dissenting opinion applicable to both Barlow
and Data Processing which favored a more liberal standing approach than
that presented by justice Douglas. Id. at 167-73 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissentirig in part). justice Brennan rejected the two-prong ap-
proach of Justice Douglas, proposing that the plaintiff should only have to
meet the first test of "injury in fact" in order to have standing. Id. at 168
(Brennan, .. , concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan
felt that the "zone of interests" language of Justice Douglas' test is a noncon-
stitutional step, which, if included in the standing requirement, approaches
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Barlow may be seen as having interpreted the standing requirements
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),25 Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Organization 28 expressly stated that the "injury in fact"
test was a constitutional limitation.27
The "injury in fact" test has been further refined by the additional
requirement that the plaintiff establish "a causal connection between
the claimed injury and the challenged conduct" 28 so that the court
would be able to grant relief appropriate to redress the injury.29 While
this requirement has sometimes been imposed rigorously, at other times
it has been imposed in a more relaxed form.30
Plaintiffs have attempted to assert standing solely on the basis of
their right to a government which follows its constitutional provisions
and statutes, but the Supreme Court has held that such citizen standing
should be denied to plaintiffs asserting only a generalized grievance
the rejected "legally protected interest" requirement. Id. For a further dis-
cussion of Justice Brennan's view, see Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing,
37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450 (1970).
25. See 397 U.S. at 357. Section 10 of the APA provides, in pertinent
part, that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a rele-
vant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
26. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). For a discussion of Simon, see note 30 infra.
27. Id. at 38-39. Simon, however, was also a case in which standing was
asserted under § 10 of the APA. Id. at 38.
28. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (citation omitted); Accord, Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 38.
29. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59, 74 (1978), citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
at 43.
30. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 3-21 (1978). Compare
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) with Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
In Simon, indigent plaintiffs brought an action against the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assert-
ing that the IRS had violated the Internal Revenue Code and the APA by
issuing a Revenue Ruling allowing favorable tax treatment to a non-profit
hospital that offered only emergency room services to indigents. 426 U.S. at
28. Each individual plaintiff alleged instances in which he had been denied
hospital service because of his indigency. Id. at 32. The Supreme Court,
however, denied the plaintiffs' standing to bring a suit on the basis that the
connection between the plaintiffs' injury and the defendant's tax ruling was
too tenuous and that it was speculative whether a favorable ruling by a court
on the substantive issue in the case would result in the availability of more
hospital services to the plaintiffs. Id. at 42-43.
In Duke Power, the plaintiffs, residents of North and South Carolina,
challenged the constitutionality of a statute limiting the liability for damages
caused by a nuclear accident, asserting that this statute would result in the
construction of proposed nuclear power plants near them. 438 U.S. at 64-67,
72-73. The plaintiffs alleged that these power plants would harm their living
and working environment. Id. at 72-73. The Supreme Court held that stand.
ing was appropriate in this case because there was sufficient support for the
district court's finding that a "substantial likelihood" existed that the power
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"common to all members of the public." 31 The Court reasoned that
such a grievance is not a sufficiently concrete injury to meet the "injury
in fact" test.32 The Court has recently applied this concept in United
States v. Richardson,33 in which it denied standing to the plaintiff's
challenge to an alleged violation of the receipts and expenditures clause
of the Constitution; 34 and in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War,35 in which it denied standing to the plaintiffs' challenge
31. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974), quot-
ing Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972); Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634
(1937).
32. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974). For a discus-
sion of Richardson, see notes 33-34 & 37-38 and accompanying text infra.
33. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). In Richardson, the plaintiff claimed that there
were unconstitutional provisions in the Central Intelligence Act which pre-
vented him from obtaining documents setting out the expenditures and re-
ceipts of the CIA. Id. at 169. See 50 U.S.C. §403(a)-403(j) (1976).
34. 418 U.S. at 167-68. This clause provides that a regular statement and
account of the receipts and expenditures of all money withdrawn from the
Treasury shall be published. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
Justice Powell, concurring in Richardson, stated that he views taxpayer
and citizen suits as an effort to use the federal courts to voice generalized
grievances about government conduct or the allocation of power within the
federal system. 418 U.S. at 196 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell op-
posed the abolition of standing requirements, which he viewed as implicit
in allowing a citizen to use the courts to negate unconstitutional acts of the
federal government. Id. at 195 (Powell, J., concurring).
The defendant in Richardson had appealed from a decision of the Third
Circuit which had held that the plaintiff had standing. Richardson v. United
States, 465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1972) rev'd, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). Judge Rosenn,
in the Third Circuit's majority opinion, had stated that a plaintiff's "per-
sonal stake [in the outcome] may come from any injury in fact even if it is
not directly economic in motive." 465 F.2d at 853, citing Data Processing
Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. at 154. Judge Adams, foreshadowing his opinion
in Americans United, stated in a dissenting opinion that in determining
whether standing is appropriate, the court must look to the importance of
the asserted constitutional right and the nature of the injury suffered by the
plaintiff. 465 F.2d at 871 (Adams, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Judge
Adams' opinion in Americans United, see notes 57-74 and accompanying text
infra. Judge Adams noted that standing to litigate questions concerning the
establishment clause and other constitutional rights of paramount importance
might be found in the absence of direct injury. 465 F.2d at 869 (Adams, J.,
dissenting). Judge Adams concluded, however, that the expenditures and
receipts clause of the Constitution is not of paramount importance, as is the
Bill of Rights, and that, as the plaintiff merely had a general interest common
to all, he should not be granted standing. Id. at 872-73 (Adams, J., dissent-
ing). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's view of the importance of the
Bill of Rights, see note 44 and accompanying text infra.
35. 418 U.S. 208 (1974). In Schlesinger, the plaintiffs alleged that mili-
tary reserve positions held by Congressmen violated the incompatibility clause
by placing them under the possible influence of the Executive Branch and
by placing inconsistent obligations upon them. Id. at 212. In denying stand-
ing, the Supreme Court held that the broadening of categories of cognizable
injury does not mean that the Court has abandoned the requirement that
plaintiff must himself have suffered an injury. Id. at 218, citing Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972). For a discussion of Sierra Club, see
note 42 infra.
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to an alleged violation of the incompatibility clause.3 6 The Court in
Richardson also rejected the plaintiff's argument that citizen standing
should be granted because there was no better plaintiff to bring the
action.3 7 The Court reasoned that the lack of a plaintiff to litigate the
claim supports the view that the constitutional provision was not in-
tended to be protected by the courts, but by the surveillance of Con-
gress and, ultimately, the political process.
38
While the Court has insisted that a generalized grievance is not
sufficient to meet the "injury in fact" test,3 9 an aesthetic interest in a
clean environment was held to be sufficient to establish standing in
United States v. SCRAP.40 The SCRAP Court stated that standing
should not be denied merely because the injury is one shared by many
people.41 However, the Court said that to justify standing, the plaintiff
must allege a specific injury to himself in order to insure that the liti-
gant has a direct stake in the controversy and to prevent "the judicial
process from becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of
the value interests of concerned bystanders." 42
36. 418 U.S. at 180. This clause prevents a Congressman from holding a
civil office in the United States while serving in Congress. U.S. CONST. art I,
§6, cl. 2.
37. 418 U.S. at 179.
38. Id. The Supreme Court stated that any other conclusion would allow
citizens to oversee the conduct of the national government through lawsuits in
the courts. Id. The Court noted that, if denied standing, dissatisfied citizens
are still able to convince fellow electors to change members of the political
branches who are delinquent in performing their duties. Id.
39. For a discussion of this requirement, see notes 31-38 and accompanying
text supra.
40. 412 U.S. 669, 683-90 (1973). Accord, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 734-35 (1972). The Court had previously said, through dictum in Data
Processing, that an aesthetic, conservational, or recreational interest by a plain-
tiff may be sufficient to grant standing. Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. at 54.
In SCRAP, standing was granted to the plaintiffs, a group of law stu-
dents who challenged railroad rates fixed by an agency, who alleged standing on
the basis that the high rates would reduce the use of reusable goods and
encourage the destruction of timber, resulting in harm to the natural resources
of the area. 412 U.S. at 678, 681 n.9. The plaintiff alleged that each of its
members used these resources and that the harm to the resources affected their
use. Id. at 678.
41. 412 U.S. at 686-87.
42. Id. at 687, citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In
Sierra Club, the plaintiffs challenged governmental approval of the development
of a national game refuge and a national park. Id. at 728-29. The plaintiffs
sued as a membership corporation with a "special interest" in the conserva-
tion and maintenance of parks, game refuges, and forests in the United States.
Id. at 730. By a 4-3 vote, the court denied the plaintiffs standing on the
basis that a special interest in a subject is not sufficient grounds for standing,
and that the plaintiffs must allege facts showing that they personally are
adversely affected. Id. at 73940. The Court said that broadening the cate-
gories of injury that may be alleged to support standing does not abolish the
requirement that plaintiff must have suffered "injury in fact." Id. at 738.
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In considering standing to bring suit for a violation of the first
amendment, the Court has taken a less restrictive approach than in
cases concerning standing to assert interests in the clauses of Article I
of the Constitution.43 This is consistent with the Court's view that the
purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
political controversy, establishing them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts. 44 The Data Processing Court stated, in dictum, that "[a]
person or a family may have a spiritual stake in first amendment values
sufficient to give standing to raise issues concerning the establishment
clause and the free exercise clause." 45 This premise depends, in part,
on the proposition that all citizens share a personal constitutional right
to a government that "shall make no law respecting the establishment
of religion." 46
Although the Supreme Court has not held that there is citizen
standing in first amendment cases, the Court, in A bington School
District v. ScheMpp,4 7 held that a Pennsylvania statute 48 which author-
ized Bible reading in a public school was unconstitutional, as a violation
of the establishment clause.49 While the Court did not specifically
address the standing issue in striking down the statute, it recognized
ing that there was no real harm or threat of harm to plaintiff). The Sierra
Club Court continued: "[I]f a 'special interest' in this subject were enough
to entitle the Sierra Club to commence this litigation, there would appear to
be no objective basis upon which to disallow a suit by any 'special interest'
organization . . . ." 405 U.S. at 739. The Court did state, however, that an
organization whose members are injured may represent those members in a
judicial proceeding. Id. at 739, citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428
(1963).
Some commentators have interpreted the holding in Sierra as turning on
a technical defect of pleading. See, e.g., Scott, Standing in the Supreme
Court - A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. Rv. 645, 667 (1973). Moreover,
others, such as Professor Jaffee, a leading commentator in this area, favor gen-
eralized citizen suits in this area. See, e.g., Jaffee, The Citizen As Litigant in
Public Action: The Non-Hahfelder or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. Rv.
1033 (1968). Professor Jaffee argues that the very fact that the plaintiff would
receive no profit in winning such a lawsuit shows a great desire on the part of
the plaintiff to say all that can be said in support of his contention, thus
ensuring concrete adverseness. Id. at 1038.
43. Compare notes 45-50 and accompanying text infra, with notes 31-38
and accompanying text supra.
44. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
The Supreme Court stated in Barnette that "[t]he very purpose of a Bill of
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political con-
troversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." Id.
45. 397 U.S. at 154, citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 114 (Stewart,
J., concurring).
47. 374 U.S. 203 (1963), aff'g, 177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
48. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1516 (Purdon 1962) (held unconstitutional).
49. 374 U.S. at 223-27.
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the district court's finding that the parents of Pennsylvania school
children had standing to bring the action.50
Where the plaintiff bases his right to sue on his role as a taxpayer, a
separate test for standing has been applied, 51 The Supreme Court first
enunciated the now famous "double nexus" test for taxpayer standing
in Flast v. Cohen,52 an establishment clause case.58  To qualify under
this test, the litigant must establish that the challenged statute is a
spending or taxing law, enacted pursuant to Congress' Article I, Section
8 powers, so that his taxpayer status is linked to the challenged legis-
lation.5 4 Secondly, the plaintiff must show that the challenged statute
exceeds the constitutional limitations on the government's taxing and
spending power, so that the proper nexus between his taxpayer status
and the alleged constitutional violation is shown.55 The double-nexus
50. See 374 U.S. at 203. For the district court's discussion of standing, see
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 177 F. Supp. 398, 403 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that standing is appropriate because the alleged
injury, if proven, was direct to the plaintiffs).
51. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text infra.
52. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Prior to Flast, the leading case in the area of tax-
payer standing was Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 446 (1923). In Frothing-
ham, the plaintiff attacked the Maternity Act, which provided for appropria-
tions by the federal government to states in order to reduce maternal and
infant mortality. Id. at 479. See Maternity and Infancy Hygiene Act, ch. 135,
42 stat. 224 (1921). The plaintiff alleged taxpayer standing on the ground
that the statute would increase her taxes, resulting in the deprivation of prop-
erty without due process of law. 262 U.S. at 486. The Court denied the
plaintiff standing to sue stating:
[A taxpayer's] interest in the moneys of the Treasury . . . is shared
with millions of others; is comparably minute and interminable; and
the effect of future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so
remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded to an ap-
peal to the preventive powers of a court of equity.
If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then
every other taxpayer may do the same .. . . We have no power
per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they
are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when
the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, pre-
senting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act.
Id. at 487-88.
53. 392 U.S. at 85. The plaintiffs in Flast alleged taxpayer standing to
challenge payments to sectarian schools for the purpose of financing instruction
and purchasing textbooks in reading, arithmetic and other secular subjects, as
violating both the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amend-
ment. Id. at 85-86. These payments were made in accordance with Titles I
and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. See 20
U.S.C. §§ 241(a)-(c) & (e)-(f), 821-27 (1976). The Flast plaintiffs were granted
taxpayer standing by the Supreme Court, thereby overruling the district court's
decision. 392 U.S. at 106.
54. 392 U.S. at 102.
55. Id. at 102-03. The Court explained that it is not enough for the
taxpayer to show "simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers
delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8." Id. at 103. The Court went on to say
that one of the evils feared by those who created the establishment clause was
59
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requirement has been limited to cases in which a plaintiff asserts stand-
ing to challenge government action based solely on the fact that the
action injures the plaintiff's interest as a taxpayer.56
Against this background, Judge Adams considered the question of
individual and group standing to challenge the government's transfer
of property to a sectarian institution.57 Judge Adams first concluded
that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the double-nexus test for taxpayer
standing.58 He then rejected the argument, which had been accepted
by the district court, 59 that the failure to vest taxpayer standing meant
that the plaintiffs had no basis to assert standing.60
Judge Adams then examined the plaintiffs' interest, as citizens, in
the protection afforded by the establishment clause to the separation of
church and state as an independent basis for standing.61 To determine
whether the "injury in fact" test had been met,62 Judge Adams asked
whether the plaintiffs were asserting a particular and concrete injury to
a right protected by a constitutional guarantee, as opposed to a general-
ized grievance.68 Judge Adams noted that under this line of analysis,
that the taxing and spending power would be used to favor religion. Id.,
citing 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 186 (Hunt ed. 1901).
Justice Harlan, dissenting, attacked the majority's double-nexus test as
not measuring the plaintiff's interest in the outcome of a suit. Id. at 121-24
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Powell has also supported the position that
the double-nexus test does not test for concrete adverseness. See, e.g., United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 182-84 (Powell, J., concurring).
56. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978) (holding that the Flast test did not apply because
this case involved a citizen's suit, not a taxpayer suit).
57. 619 F.2d at 260-66. See notes 58-74 and accompanying text infra.
58. 619 F.2d at 259-60. Judge Adams held that under present law, liti-
gants have taxpayer standing only to challenge exercises of the taxing and
spending power and not actions authorized by other constitutional provisions.
Id. at 260. For a discussion of taxpayer standing, see notes 52-55 and accom-
panying text supra.
Judge Adams questioned whether the current restriction of taxpayer stand-
ing to alleged violations of the taxing and spending clause is proper. 619
F.2d at 260. For a discussion of previous criticism of this rule, see note 55
supra.
59. See notes 9-10 and accompanying text supra.
60. 619 F.2d at 260. Judge Adams rejected the district court's assumption
that the plaintiffs alleged only taxpayer standing. Id. Judge Adams noted
that Justice Fortas has raised the issue of whether a citizen's interest in the
establishment clause would be an acceptable basis for standing to challenge
an alleged violation of the clause, but that the question has yet to be an-
swered. Id. at 262, citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 115-16 (Fortas, J.,
concurring).
61. 619 F.2d at 261-66.
62. For a general discussion of "injury in fact", see notes 21-50 and ac-
companying text supra.
63. 619 F.2d at 262-65. For a discussion of cases where standing was de-
nied because the plaintiffs' claims were seen as generalized grievances, see notes
31-38 and accompanying text supra.
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the "injury in fact" requirement is not independent of the inquiry into
the nature of the interest to be protected.
64
In answering the question posed, Judge Adams held that the instant
case did not involve merely a generalized claim, based on a constitutional
provision which was not intended to be enforceable by the public, 66 but
rather, concerned a constitutional provision which creates fundamental
legal rights in each individual citizen. 6 Judge Adams noted that the
Bill of Rights was specifically intended to establish certain limitations
on the government as legal principles for the courts to apply.6 7 He
asserted that unless individuals who claim a violation of legal rights,
bestowed upon them by the Constitution, have some recourse other
than the political process, the individual rights are devoid of meaning.
8
From this reasoning, Judge Adams concluded that the plaintiffs in
Americans United were not merely ideological plaintiffs, concerned with
64. 619 F.2d at 263. This appears to be the appropriate view of current
standing law. Compare Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 102-03 (creating a separate
rule for standing when the plaintiff is alleging an interest as a taxpayer requir-
ing plaintiff to meet a double-nexus test) with Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. at 79 (holding that plaintiff need
not meet the double-nexus standard in order to have standing, when alleging
standing based on his rights as a citizen). For a discussion of Flast, see notes
51-55 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Duke Power, see note
56 and accompanying text supra. This view of standing was expressed earlier
by Judge Adams in Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844, 872-73 (3d Cir.
1972) (Adams, J., dissenting), rev'd, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). See note 34 supra.
In holding that an examination of "injury in fact" includes an inquiry
into the nature of the interest to be protected, Judge Adams contrasted cases
in which standing was granted because the plaintiff was alleging injury to a
fundamental individual right, with those in which standing was denied be-
cause no such claim of injury to a fundamental individual right was alleged.
619 F.2d at 263-64. Compare Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (standing
granted where the plaintiff alleged injury to his right to vote) with United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (standing denied where the plaintiff
alleged a constitutional violation of the receipts and expenditures clause). For
a discussion of Baker, see notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra. For a dis-
cussion of Richardson, see notes 31-34 & 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
65. 619 F.2d at 215. Hence, Judge Adams did not view this case as
similar to Schlesinger and Richardson because the alleged bases for standing
in those two cases, he asserted, were constitutional provisions not intended to
be enforced by each individual citizen but were "general directives to the
Congress or the Executive .... " Id. at 263, quoting United States v. Rich-
ardson, 418 U.S. at 178 n.l1. For a discussion of Schlesinger and Richardson,
see notes 31-38 and accompanying text supra.
66. 619 F.2d at 264-65. In so holding, Judge Adams quoted the language
of Data Processing which said, in dictum, that "a spiritual stake in First
Amendment values [is] sufficient to give standing to raise issues concerning
the Establishment Clause." Id. at 264, quoting Data Processing Serv. Orgs.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. at 154 (bracket supplied by the Americans United court).
For a discussion of this view, see note 45 and accompanying text supra. Judge
Adams also analogized to the grant of standing in Schempp. 619 F.2d at
264, citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). For a
discussion of Schempp, see notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra.
67. 619 F.2d at 265, quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 638 (1943). See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
68. 619 F.2d at 265.
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enforcing generalized grievances; 69 instead, the plaintiffs' complaint was
characterized as "a particular and concrete injury to a right that is . . .
protected by the constitutional guarantee raised." 70
In holding that the plaintiffs had standing, Judge Adams stated
that an allegation of "injury in fact" to an interest protected by the
establishment clause is sufficient to establish standing.71  Under the
court's rationale, the plaintiff need not actually prove that the govern-
ment violated a legal right under the establishment clause in order to
meet this threshold requirement. 72 This heavier burden of proof is for
the merits of the case.73 The court found that the plaintiffs had met
this minimum standing requirement because it is "arguable that the
Establishment Clause creates in each citizen a 'personal constitutional
right' to a government that does not establish religion." 74
Judge Rosenn concurred in the decision of the court, but provided
an additional reason for finding standing.75 Like Judge Adams, 76 Judge
Rosenn viewed first amendment rights as different from the interests
considered in Richardson and Schlesinger.7 7 Judge Rosenn noted that
to be effective, first amendment interests must be enforced through the
courts and cannot depend on the political process for vindication.78
69. Id.
70. Id. Judge Adams explained that the plaintiffs' claim was that the
property transfer injured their "individual and personal constitutional right
of religious liberty and separation of church and state." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. This is in accord with what Schenpp had said concerning a chal-
lenge to a state action. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at
224 n.9. The Schempp Court had noted that "the requirements for standing
to challenge state action under the establishment clause ... do not include
proof that religious freedoms are infringed." Id.
73. 619 F.2d at 265. Judge Adams noted that legal rights will be recog-
nized in the plaintiffs only if the court determines, on the merits, that the
government action is barred by the establishment clause. Id.
74. Id., quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 114 (Stewart, J., concurring).
The Court stated that "it may well be that the Establishment Clause should
be enforceable at the demand of every individual who claims injury to an
interest protected thereby." 619 F.2d at 266.
75. 619 F.2d at 266-68 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
76. For a discussion of Judge Adams' distinction of these cases, see notes
65-70 and accompanying text supra.
77. 619 F.2d at 266-68 (Rosenn, J., concurring). Richardson and Schlesin.
ger involved attempts to enforce the receipts and expenditures clause and the
incompatibility clause of the Constitution. See notes 31-38 and accompany-
ing text supra. Judge Rosenn distinguished these cases as attempts to en-
force provisions of the Constitution which were not intended to depend upon
judicial relief for their efficacy and which do not give rise to a judicially cog-
nizable controversy when violated. 619 F.2d at 266, 267 n.l (Rosenn, J.,
concurring).
78. 619 F.2d at 266-67 (Rosenn, J., concurring). Judge Rosenn said that
this is true because the establishment clause was designed to protect against
abuses of political minorities by political majorities. Id. at 266 (Rosenn, J.,
concurring). For a further discussion of this view, see notes 67-68 and accom-
panying text supra. Judge Rosenn analogized establishment clause cases to
first amendment free speech cases, where, he said, liberal standing rules have
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Judge Rosenn also observed that statutes violating the establishment
clause may not have a sufficient impact on any one person to qualify
him as a proper plaintiff under traditional standing requirements. 79
Hence, there may be no better plaintiffs than exist here.8 0 Upholding
standing, Judge Rosenn concluded that "[i]f [these plaintiffs] do not
have standing, it is probable that the transfer of property at issue here
• would be placed beyond judicial review [and] the establishment
clause would be rendered virtually unenforceable." 81
Judge Weis dissented on the ground that there was no "injury in
fact" to the plaintiffs. 8 2 He emphasized that a generalized grievance
brought by concerned citizens does not meet the "injury in fact" stand-
ard.83 In his analysis, Judge Weis emphasized that, in Flast, the Supreme
Court had the opportunity to find citizen standing with respect to
interests arising from the establishment clause but did not do so.8
4
Judge Weis viewed Flast as an implicit rejection of standing predicated
upon a shared individual right to a government that shall make no law
respecting the establishment of religion.8s He concluded that standing
been applied to insure the ability of the minority to enforce the important
right of free speech. Id. at 267 (Rosenn, J., concurring), citing Broaderick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
79. 619 F.2d at 268 (Rosenn, J., concurring). Judge Rosenn reasoned
that statutes violating the establishment clause may have a general effect or
purpose of aiding religion, so that they do not impact greatly on any one
person. Id.
80. Id. Judge Rosenn concedes that one can conceive of economic inter-
ests which may be affected by establishment clause violations that would give
rise to a plaintiff who can meet traditional standing requirements. Id. How-
ever, he argues that this will be rare and that, in any event, no such plain-
tiff is available in the instant situation since no other organization had actu-
ally applied for the land in question. Id. at 268 & n.2 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 268 (Rosenn, J., concurring). Judge Rosenn noted that a
number of other similar transfers would also be placed beyond judicial re-
view. Id.
82. Id. at 268-71 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis noted that the Su-
preme Court, although expanding the category of actionable injuries, has not
abandoned the "injury in fact" requirement. Id. at 268 (Weis, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of "injury in fact," see notes 21-50 and accompanying text
supra.
83. 619 F.2d at 269 (Weis, J., dissenting), citing Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 31-38 and ac-
companying text supra.
84. 619 F.2d at 269-70 (Weis, J., dissenting). In Flast, Justice Fortas, con-
curring, mentioned that perhaps a citizen's interest in the establishment clause,
without reference to the taxpayer's status, would provide standing. Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. at 115-16 (Fortas, J., concurring). For a discussion of Flast,
see notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
85. 619 F.2d at 269-70 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis stated that "[i]t
is obvious that there were not enough votes approving this concept, for other-
wise the majority would not have found it necessary to construct the compli-
cated and detailed formula it used to bypass the venerable prohibition against
taxpayer standing." Id. at 269 (Weis, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
majority's opposing view of Flast, see 619 F.2d at 260; note 60 supra.
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should be denied when there is no cognizable injury to the plaintiffs
because the plaintiffs' freedom of religion is not alleged to be affected.
8 6
It is submitted that Judge Adams avoided the crucial question
raised by Americans United - whether standing rules need to be liberal-
ized in first amendment challenges to government action to allow a less
traditional plaintiff, such as Americans United, to assert standing.8 7 In
order to avoid this issue, yet achieve the outcome he desired, Judge
Adams unsuccessfully attempted to conform the Americans United case
to the framework of Supreme Court precedent in the area of standing.
88
Under Judge Adams' construction of past cases, generalized griev-
ances of ideological plaintiffs are insufficient to provide standing.8 9
Judge Adams points, however, to the importance of enabling an indi-
vidual citizen to bring a suit for an arguable violation of the establish-
ment clause because that clause creates a fundamental right 0o and then
concludes that because fundamental rights, subject to judicial enforce-
ment by an individual citizen, are involved, the plaintiffs' complaint is
not general, but particular and concrete. 9' Further than this conclusory
observation, though, Judge Adams never explains why Americans United
are not pure ideological plaintiffs. 92
While, as Judge Adams indicated, "injury in fact" and the nature
of the plaintiff's alleged interests are related concepts,9 3 it is submitted
that the Supreme Court has refused to recognize an individual's alleged
important interest in a subject matter,9 4 and in particular, a concern
86. 619 F.2d at 270 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis stated that the
plaintiffs did not allege any direct injury which the property transfer inflicted
on them, but alleged merely that the transfer violated the establishment clause.
Id. He rejected the majority's argument that the establishment clause creates
a right capable of being enforced by all citizens. Id. at 271 (Weis, J., dis-
senting).
87. This question was addressed by Judge Rosenn. See notes 78-80 and
accompanying text supra.
88. See 619 F.2d at 265, citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 129 n.18 (Har-
lan, J., dissenting). While Judge Adams, in discussing the "injury in fact"
test, cited cases which appear to require some concrete impact on plaintiffs, he
granted standing to plaintiffs who had not shown such impact. See 619 F.2d
at 264.
89. 619 F.2d at 262-63. See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra. For
a general discussion of cases denying standing to plaintiffs asserting generalized
views, see notes 31-38 and accompanying text supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
91. See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
92. See 619 F.2d at 264-65. Judge Adams asserted that the plaintiffs had
successfully alleged that the transfer "seriously injures their individual and
personal constitutional right of religious liberty and separation of church and
state." Id. at 265. It is submitted that the plaintiffs have not alleged facts
to show that such an injury is not shared equally by the rest of the United
States citizenry, and is, therefore, a generalized grievance. See 619 F.2d at
270 (Weis, J., dissenting); note 86 and accompanying text supra.
93. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
94. The Supreme Court has specifically denied standing to plaintiffs as.
serting an interest in enforcement of Article I provisions of the Constitution
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with the enforcement of the establishment clause,9 5 as sufficient to estab-
lish "injury in fact". It is further submitted that it is difficult to en-
vision a plaintiff more ideological than the plaintiffs in this case.96
Judge Rosenn's concurring opinion, it is suggested, properly con-
cluded that the plaintiffs' standing should be recognized, not under
existing case law, but rather under a broader view of standing appro-
priate to the fundamental interests embodied in the first amendment. 97
While the Supreme Court has previously denied standing to ideological
plaintiffs,98 it is submitted that standing should be liberalized, so that
plaintiffs claiming infringement on a first amendment guarantee will
have access to the federal courts. It is clear that the establishment clause
was intended, at least partially, as a protection for minorities,99 making
its enforcement thoroughly unsuited for the political process,1 0 unlike
the provisions with which earlier Supreme Court citizen standing cases
were concerned.101 Moreover, the argument that rarely will a more
appropriate plaintiff than Americans United be found in these types of
actions, is sound.10 2 It is submitted that if, in a substantial number of
cases, no one has standing to challenge government action which is in
violation of the establishment clause, the provision will lose its effective-
ness. 108 To preserve the efficacy of the clause, therefore, it is submitted
in Schlesinger and Richardson. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 31-38
and accompanying text supra.
95. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The idea of granting standing
to a plaintiff based on his interest as a citizen in the enforcement of the
establishment clause was raised in Flast but not accepted by a majority of the
Court. See id. at 115-16 (Fortas, J., concurring). While standing was granted
in Schempp to bring an action under the establishment clause, the plaintiffs
in Schempp could claim a specific injury that was not shared equally by all
members of the public. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963); notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra.
96. See 619 F.2d at 270-71 (Weis, J., dissenting). It is submitted that
Judge Weis is correct in his observation that "[t]he plaintiffs do not allege any
direct injury that the transfer of the property has inflicted upon them or any
direct benefit that will accrue to them as a result of the requested judicial
action." Id. at 270 (Weis, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the require-
ments of direct injury and the necessity of the court being able to remedy the
injury, see notes 28-30 & 41-42 and accompanying text supra. For a discus-
sion of other cases involving ideological plaintiffs, see notes 31-38 and accom-
panying text supra.
97. For a discussion of Judge Rosenn's opinion, see notes 75-81 and accom-
panying text supra.
98. See notes 31-38 and accompanying text supra.
99. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943);
note 44 and accompanying text supra.
100. 619 F.2d at 265; id. at 267 (Rosenn, J., concurring). See also note 44
and accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 31-38 and accompanying text supra.
102. See note 103 and accompanying text infra. There will be those rare
cases where a better plaintiff is available, however. See note 80 supra.
103. If a minority cannot enforce the establishment clause through the
courts, the establishment clause will not be accomplishing its purpose of pro-




Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1981
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
that standing must be expanded in establishment clause cases. Although
the dissenting opinion of Judge Weis is correct in its observation that
the plaintiffs in Americans United are asserting a generalized griev-
ance,1 04 it is submitted that there will rarely be a greater individual
impact in this type of establishment clause case because the prohibition
is against the government. 05
If the holding and rationale of Americans United are followed by
other courts, the result could be to expand the law of standing to allow
citizen standing to contest all government actions which allegedly vio-
late a constitutional provision intended for the specific protection of
individual citizens.1 0 However, considering the Supreme Court's strict
adherence to the notion that a generalized grievance is not sufficient to
confer standing, 07 it is doubtful that the reasoning of the case will be
applied to cases outside the first amendment area. 08
It is also arguable that the holding of this case eliminates the need
for the double-nexus test of Flast in establishment clause claims. 109 If
so, there will no longer be any need for a plaintiff to assert his taxpayer
status to establish standing when challenging a statute as a violation
of the establishment clause if status as a citizen is sufficient. It is sub-
mitted that this is a further step 110 in the trend towards the elimination
of the double-nexus rule."'
Gary D. Bressler
gion. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
An analogy may be drawn between this reasoning and the decision in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). In Bivens, the Court allowed a federal action for damages against
federal narcotics agents who had violated the fourth amendment through an
unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at 399. In this decision, the Supreme
Court expressed a concern that the constitutional protection of the fourth
amendment becomes ineffective without individual enforcement. Id. It is
submitted that the same concern exists with establishment clause cases.
104. For a discussion of Judge Weis' opinion, see notes 82-86 and accom-
panying text supra.
105. See 619 F.2d at 268 (Rosenn, J., concurring); notes 79-80 and accom-
panying text supra.
106. This may include actions violating any of the Bill of Rights. See
West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); note 44 and
accompanying text supra.
107. See notes 31-38 and accompanying text supra.
108. The Court has expressed a special concern with the protection of a
citizen's first amendment rights, although this has previously been expressed
in the context of free speech. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 815-18
(1975); Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
109. For a discussion of Flast, see notes 52-55 and accompanying text
supra.
110. The Court has already limited Flast to the narrow area of cases where
plaintiff alleges taxpayer standing. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
111. There is much support for eliminating this rule entirely. See note
55 supra.
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